/*

  *  Copyright (C) 2013-2019 Cisco Systems, Inc. and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
  *  Copyright (C) 2011-2013 Sourcefire, Inc.

  *
  *  Authors: aCaB
  *
  *  This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
  *  it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as
  *  published by the Free Software Foundation.
  *
  *  This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
  *  but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
  *  MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
  *  GNU General Public License for more details.
  *
  *  You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
  *  along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
  *  Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston,
  *  MA 02110-1301, USA.
  */
 
 #if HAVE_CONFIG_H
 #include "clamav-config.h"
 #endif
 
 #include <time.h>
 

 #include "clamav.h"

 #include "asn1.h"
 #include "bignum.h"

 #include "matcher-hash.h"

 /* --------------------------------------------------------------------------- OIDS */
 #define OID_1_3_14_3_2_26 "\x2b\x0e\x03\x02\x1a"
 #define OID_sha1 OID_1_3_14_3_2_26
 
 #define OID_1_3_14_3_2_29 "\x2b\x0e\x03\x02\x1d"
 #define OID_sha1WithRSA OID_1_3_14_3_2_29
 
 #define OID_1_2_840_113549_1_1_1 "\x2a\x86\x48\x86\xf7\x0d\x01\x01\x01"
 #define OID_rsaEncryption OID_1_2_840_113549_1_1_1
 

 #define OID_1_2_840_113549_1_1_2 "\x2a\x86\x48\x86\xf7\x0d\x01\x01\x02"
 #define OID_md2WithRSAEncryption OID_1_2_840_113549_1_1_2
 

 #define OID_1_2_840_113549_1_1_4 "\x2a\x86\x48\x86\xf7\x0d\x01\x01\x04"
 #define OID_md5WithRSAEncryption OID_1_2_840_113549_1_1_4
 
 #define OID_1_2_840_113549_1_1_5 "\x2a\x86\x48\x86\xf7\x0d\x01\x01\x05"
 #define OID_sha1WithRSAEncryption OID_1_2_840_113549_1_1_5
 

 #define OID_1_2_840_113549_1_1_11 "\x2a\x86\x48\x86\xf7\x0d\x01\x01\x0b"
 #define OID_sha256WithRSAEncryption OID_1_2_840_113549_1_1_11
 

 #define OID_1_2_840_113549_1_1_12 "\x2a\x86\x48\x86\xf7\x0d\x01\x01\x0c"
 #define OID_sha384WithRSAEncryption OID_1_2_840_113549_1_1_12
 

 #define OID_1_2_840_113549_1_1_13 "\x2a\x86\x48\x86\xf7\x0d\x01\x01\x0d"
 #define OID_sha512WithRSAEncryption OID_1_2_840_113549_1_1_13
 

 #define OID_1_2_840_113549_1_7_1 "\x2a\x86\x48\x86\xf7\x0d\x01\x07\x01"
 #define OID_pkcs7_data OID_1_2_840_113549_1_7_1
 
 #define OID_1_2_840_113549_1_7_2 "\x2a\x86\x48\x86\xf7\x0d\x01\x07\x02"
 #define OID_signedData OID_1_2_840_113549_1_7_2
 
 #define OID_1_2_840_113549_1_9_3 "\x2a\x86\x48\x86\xf7\x0d\x01\x09\x03"
 #define OID_contentType OID_1_2_840_113549_1_9_3
 
 #define OID_1_2_840_113549_1_9_4 "\x2a\x86\x48\x86\xf7\x0d\x01\x09\x04"
 #define OID_messageDigest OID_1_2_840_113549_1_9_4
 
 #define OID_1_2_840_113549_1_9_5 "\x2a\x86\x48\x86\xf7\x0d\x01\x09\x05"
 #define OID_signingTime OID_1_2_840_113549_1_9_5
 
 #define OID_1_2_840_113549_2_5 "\x2a\x86\x48\x86\xf7\x0d\x02\x05"
 #define OID_md5 OID_1_2_840_113549_2_5
 
 #define OID_1_2_840_113549_1_9_6 "\x2a\x86\x48\x86\xf7\x0d\x01\x09\x06"
 #define OID_countersignature OID_1_2_840_113549_1_9_6
 

 #define OID_1_2_840_113549_1_9_16_1_4 "\x2a\x86\x48\x86\xf7\x0d\x01\x09\x10\x01\x04"
 #define OID_timestampToken OID_1_2_840_113549_1_9_16_1_4
 

 #define OID_1_3_6_1_4_1_311_2_1_4 "\x2b\x06\x01\x04\x01\x82\x37\x02\x01\x04"
 #define OID_SPC_INDIRECT_DATA_OBJID OID_1_3_6_1_4_1_311_2_1_4
 
 #define OID_1_3_6_1_4_1_311_2_1_15 "\x2b\x06\x01\x04\x01\x82\x37\x02\x01\x0f"
 #define OID_SPC_PE_IMAGE_DATA_OBJID OID_1_3_6_1_4_1_311_2_1_15
 
 #define OID_1_3_6_1_4_1_311_2_1_25 "\x2b\x06\x01\x04\x01\x82\x37\x02\x01\x19"
 #define OID_SPC_CAB_DATA_OBJID OID_1_3_6_1_4_1_311_2_1_25
 

 #define OID_1_3_6_1_4_1_311_2_4_1 "\x2b\x06\x01\x04\x01\x82\x37\x02\x04\x01"
 #define OID_nestedSignatures OID_1_3_6_1_4_1_311_2_4_1
 

 #define OID_1_3_6_1_4_1_311_10_1 "\x2b\x06\x01\x04\x01\x82\x37\x0a\x01"
 #define OID_szOID_CTL OID_1_3_6_1_4_1_311_10_1
 
 #define OID_1_3_6_1_4_1_311_12_1_1 "\x2b\x06\x01\x04\x01\x82\x37\x0c\x01\x01"
 #define OID_szOID_CATALOG_LIST OID_1_3_6_1_4_1_311_12_1_1
 
 #define OID_1_3_6_1_4_1_311_12_1_2 "\x2b\x06\x01\x04\x01\x82\x37\x0c\x01\x02"
 #define OID_szOID_CATALOG_LIST_MEMBER OID_1_3_6_1_4_1_311_12_1_2
 

 #define OID_2_16_840_1_101_3_4_2_1 "\x60\x86\x48\x01\x65\x03\x04\x02\x01"
 #define OID_sha256 OID_2_16_840_1_101_3_4_2_1
 

 #define OID_2_16_840_1_101_3_4_2_2 "\x60\x86\x48\x01\x65\x03\x04\x02\x02"
 #define OID_sha384 OID_2_16_840_1_101_3_4_2_2
 
 #define OID_2_16_840_1_101_3_4_2_3 "\x60\x86\x48\x01\x65\x03\x04\x02\x03"
 #define OID_sha512 OID_2_16_840_1_101_3_4_2_3
 

 /* --------------------------------------------------------------------------- OIDS */

 #define lenof(x) (sizeof((x)) - 1)

 
 #define ASN1_TYPE_BOOLEAN 0x01
 #define ASN1_TYPE_INTEGER 0x02
 #define ASN1_TYPE_BIT_STRING 0x03
 #define ASN1_TYPE_OCTET_STRING 0x04
 #define ASN1_TYPE_NULL 0x05
 #define ASN1_TYPE_OBJECT_ID 0x06
 #define ASN1_TYPE_SEQUENCE 0x30
 #define ASN1_TYPE_SET 0x31

 #define MAX_HASH_SIZE SHA512_HASH_SIZE
 

 struct cli_asn1 {
     uint8_t type;
     unsigned int size;

     const void *content;
     const void *next;

 };

 static int map_raw(fmap_t *map, const void *data, unsigned int len, uint8_t raw[CRT_RAWMAXLEN])
 {
     unsigned int elen = MIN(len, CRT_RAWMAXLEN - 1);

     if (!fmap_need_ptr_once(map, data, elen)) {

         cli_dbgmsg("map_raw: failed to read map data\n");
         return 1;

     }
     memset(raw, 0, CRT_RAWMAXLEN);
     raw[0] = (uint8_t)elen;
     memcpy(&raw[1], data, elen);
     return 0;
 }
 

 static int map_sha512(fmap_t *map, const void *data, unsigned int len, uint8_t sha512[SHA512_HASH_SIZE])
 {
     if (!fmap_need_ptr_once(map, data, len)) {

         cli_dbgmsg("map_sha512: failed to read hash data\n");
         return 1;
     }
     return (cl_sha512(data, len, sha512, NULL) == NULL);
 }
 

 static int map_sha384(fmap_t *map, const void *data, unsigned int len, uint8_t sha384[SHA384_HASH_SIZE])
 {
     if (!fmap_need_ptr_once(map, data, len)) {

         cli_dbgmsg("map_sha384: failed to read hash data\n");
         return 1;
     }
     return (cl_sha384(data, len, sha384, NULL) == NULL);
 }
 

 static int map_sha256(fmap_t *map, const void *data, unsigned int len, uint8_t sha256[SHA256_HASH_SIZE])
 {
     if (!fmap_need_ptr_once(map, data, len)) {

         cli_dbgmsg("map_sha256: failed to read hash data\n");
         return 1;
     }
     return (cl_sha256(data, len, sha256, NULL) == NULL);
 }
 

 static int map_sha1(fmap_t *map, const void *data, unsigned int len, uint8_t sha1[SHA1_HASH_SIZE])
 {
     if (!fmap_need_ptr_once(map, data, len)) {

         cli_dbgmsg("map_sha1: failed to read hash data\n");
         return 1;

     }

     return (cl_sha1(data, len, sha1, NULL) == NULL);

 }

 static int map_md5(fmap_t *map, const void *data, unsigned int len, uint8_t *md5)
 {
     if (!fmap_need_ptr_once(map, data, len)) {

         cli_dbgmsg("map_md5: failed to read hash data\n");
         return 1;

     }

     return (cl_hash_data("md5", data, len, md5, NULL) == NULL);

 }
 

 static int map_hash(fmap_t *map, const void *data, unsigned int len, uint8_t *out_hash, cli_crt_hashtype hashtype)
 {

     if (hashtype == CLI_SHA1RSA) {
         if (map_sha1(map, data, len, out_hash)) {

             return 1;
         }

     } else if (hashtype == CLI_MD5RSA) {
         if (map_md5(map, data, len, out_hash)) {

             return 1;
         }

     } else if (hashtype == CLI_SHA256RSA) {
         if (map_sha256(map, data, len, out_hash)) {

             return 1;
         }

     } else if (hashtype == CLI_SHA384RSA) {
         if (map_sha384(map, data, len, out_hash)) {

             return 1;
         }

     } else if (hashtype == CLI_SHA512RSA) {
         if (map_sha512(map, data, len, out_hash)) {

             return 1;
         }

     } else {
         cli_dbgmsg("asn1_map_hash: unsupported hashtype\n");
         return 1;
     }
     return 0;
 }
 

 static void *get_hash_ctx(cli_crt_hashtype hashtype)
 {

     void *ctx = NULL;

     if (hashtype == CLI_SHA1RSA) {

         ctx = cl_hash_init("sha1");
     } else if (hashtype == CLI_MD5RSA) {
         ctx = cl_hash_init("md5");
     } else if (hashtype == CLI_SHA256RSA) {
         ctx = cl_hash_init("sha256");
     } else if (hashtype == CLI_SHA384RSA) {
         ctx = cl_hash_init("sha384");
     } else if (hashtype == CLI_SHA512RSA) {
         ctx = cl_hash_init("sha512");
     } else {
         cli_dbgmsg("asn1_get_hash_ctx: unsupported hashtype\n");
     }
     return ctx;
 }
 

 static int asn1_get_obj(fmap_t *map, const void *asn1data, unsigned int *asn1len, struct cli_asn1 *obj)
 {
     unsigned int asn1_sz   = *asn1len;

     unsigned int readbytes = MIN(6, asn1_sz), i;

     const uint8_t *data;

     if (asn1_sz < 2) {

         cli_dbgmsg("asn1_get_obj: insufficient data length\n");
         return 1;

     }
     data = fmap_need_ptr_once(map, asn1data, readbytes);

     if (!data) {

         cli_dbgmsg("asn1_get_obj: obj out of file\n");
         return 1;

     }
 
     obj->type = data[0];

     i         = data[1];
     data += 2;
     if (i & 0x80) {
         if (i == 0x80) {

             /* Not allowed in DER */
             cli_dbgmsg("asn1_get_obj: unsupported indefinite length object\n");
             return 1;
         }
         i &= ~0x80;

         if (i > readbytes - 2) {

             cli_dbgmsg("asn1_get_obj: len octets overflow (or just too many)\n");
             return 1;
         }
         obj->size = 0;

         while (i--) {

             obj->size <<= 8;
             obj->size |= *data;

             data++;

         }

     } else

         obj->size = i;

 
     asn1_sz -= data - (uint8_t *)asn1data;

     if (obj->size > asn1_sz) {

         cli_dbgmsg("asn1_get_obj: content overflow\n");
         return 1;

     }
 
     obj->content = data;

     if (obj->size == asn1_sz)

         obj->next = NULL;

     else

         obj->next = data + obj->size;

     *asn1len = asn1_sz - obj->size;
     return 0;
 }
 

 static int asn1_expect_objtype(fmap_t *map, const void *asn1data, unsigned int *asn1len, struct cli_asn1 *obj, uint8_t type)
 {

     int ret = asn1_get_obj(map, asn1data, asn1len, obj);

     if (ret)

         return ret;

     if (obj->type != type) {

         cli_dbgmsg("asn1_expect_objtype: expected type %02x, got %02x\n", type, obj->type);
         return 1;

     }

     return 0;
 }
 

 static int asn1_expect_obj(fmap_t *map, const void **asn1data, unsigned int *asn1len, uint8_t type, unsigned int size, const void *content)
 {

     struct cli_asn1 obj;
     int ret = asn1_expect_objtype(map, *asn1data, asn1len, &obj, type);

     if (ret)

         return ret;

     if (obj.size != size) {

         cli_dbgmsg("asn1_expect_obj: expected size %u, got %u\n", size, obj.size);
         return 1;

     }

     if (size) {
         if (!fmap_need_ptr_once(map, obj.content, size)) {

             cli_dbgmsg("asn1_expect_obj: failed to read content\n");
             return 1;
         }

         if (memcmp(obj.content, content, size)) {

             cli_dbgmsg("asn1_expect_obj: content mismatch\n");
             return 1;
         }

     }

     *asn1data = obj.next;

     return 0;
 }
 

 static int asn1_expect_algo(fmap_t *map, const void **asn1data, unsigned int *asn1len, unsigned int algo_size, const void *algo)
 {

     struct cli_asn1 obj;
     unsigned int avail;
     int ret;

     if ((ret = asn1_expect_objtype(map, *asn1data, asn1len, &obj, ASN1_TYPE_SEQUENCE))) /* SEQUENCE */

         return ret;

     avail     = obj.size;

     *asn1data = obj.next;
 

     if ((ret = asn1_expect_obj(map, &obj.content, &avail, ASN1_TYPE_OBJECT_ID, algo_size, algo))) /* ALGO */

         return ret;

 
     // The specification says that the NULL is a required parameter for this
     // data type, but in practice it doesn't always exist in the ASN1. If
     // there is something after the ALGO OID, assume it's the NULL

     if (avail && (ret = asn1_expect_obj(map, &obj.content, &avail, ASN1_TYPE_NULL, 0, NULL))) { /* NULL */

         cli_dbgmsg("asn1_expect_algo: expected NULL after AlgorithmIdentifier OID\n");

         return ret;

     }

     if (avail) {

         cli_dbgmsg("asn1_expect_algo: extra data found in SEQUENCE\n");
         return 1;

     }

     return 0;
 }
 

 static int asn1_expect_hash_algo(fmap_t *map, const void **asn1data, unsigned int *asn1len, cli_crt_hashtype *hashtype, unsigned int *hashsize)
 {

     struct cli_asn1 obj;
     unsigned int avail;
     int ret;
 

     if (0 != (ret = asn1_expect_objtype(map, *asn1data, asn1len, &obj, ASN1_TYPE_SEQUENCE))) {

         cli_dbgmsg("asn1_expect_hash_algo: expected SEQUENCE to start AlgorithmIdentifier\n");
         return ret;
     }

     avail     = obj.size;

     *asn1data = obj.next;

     if (0 != (ret = asn1_expect_objtype(map, obj.content, &avail, &obj, ASN1_TYPE_OBJECT_ID))) {

         cli_dbgmsg("asn1_expect_hash_algo: unexpected object type inside AlgorithmIdentifier SET\n");
         return ret;
     }

     /* Cases to consider for the length check:
      *  - obj.size == 5:
      *     - OID_sha1
      *  - obj.size == 8:
      *     - OID_md5
      *  - obj.size == 9:
      *     - OID_sha256
      *     - OID_sha1WithRSAEncryption
      *     - OID_md5WithRSAEncryption
      *     - OID_sha256WithRSAEncryption

      *     - OID_sha384
      *     - OID_sha384WithRSAEncryption
      *     - OID_sha512
      *     - OID_sha512WithRSAEncryption

      */

     if (obj.size != lenof(OID_sha1) && obj.size != lenof(OID_md5) && obj.size != lenof(OID_sha256)) {

         cli_dbgmsg("asn1_expect_hash_algo: unsupported algorithm OID size for AlgorithmIdentifier\n");
         return 1;
     }

     if (!fmap_need_ptr_once(map, obj.content, obj.size)) {

         cli_dbgmsg("asn1_expect_hash_algo: failed to get AlgorithmIdentifier OID\n");
         return 1;
     }

     if ((obj.size == lenof(OID_sha1) && !memcmp(obj.content, OID_sha1, lenof(OID_sha1))) ||
         (obj.size == lenof(OID_sha1WithRSAEncryption) && !memcmp(obj.content, OID_sha1WithRSAEncryption, lenof(OID_sha1WithRSAEncryption)))) {

         *hashtype = CLI_SHA1RSA;
         *hashsize = SHA1_HASH_SIZE;

     } else if ((obj.size == lenof(OID_md5) && !memcmp(obj.content, OID_md5, lenof(OID_md5))) ||
                (obj.size == lenof(OID_md5WithRSAEncryption) && !memcmp(obj.content, OID_md5WithRSAEncryption, lenof(OID_md5WithRSAEncryption)))) {

         *hashtype = CLI_MD5RSA;
         *hashsize = MD5_HASH_SIZE;

     } else if ((obj.size == lenof(OID_sha256) && !memcmp(obj.content, OID_sha256, lenof(OID_sha256))) ||
                (obj.size == lenof(OID_sha256WithRSAEncryption) && !memcmp(obj.content, OID_sha256WithRSAEncryption, lenof(OID_sha256WithRSAEncryption)))) {

         *hashtype = CLI_SHA256RSA;
         *hashsize = SHA256_HASH_SIZE;

     } else if ((obj.size == lenof(OID_sha384) && !memcmp(obj.content, OID_sha384, lenof(OID_sha384))) ||
                (obj.size == lenof(OID_sha384WithRSAEncryption) && !memcmp(obj.content, OID_sha384WithRSAEncryption, lenof(OID_sha384WithRSAEncryption)))) {

         *hashtype = CLI_SHA384RSA;
         *hashsize = SHA384_HASH_SIZE;

     } else if ((obj.size == lenof(OID_sha512) && !memcmp(obj.content, OID_sha512, lenof(OID_sha512))) ||
                (obj.size == lenof(OID_sha512WithRSAEncryption) && !memcmp(obj.content, OID_sha512WithRSAEncryption, lenof(OID_sha512WithRSAEncryption)))) {

         *hashtype = CLI_SHA512RSA;
         *hashsize = SHA512_HASH_SIZE;

     } else {
         cli_dbgmsg("asn1_expect_hash_algo: unknown digest OID in AlgorithmIdentifier\n");
         return 1;
     }

     // The specification says that the NULL is a required parameter for this
     // data type, but in practice it doesn't always exist in the ASN1. If
     // there is something after the ALGO OID, assume it's the NULL

     if (avail && (ret = asn1_expect_obj(map, &obj.next, &avail, ASN1_TYPE_NULL, 0, NULL))) {

         cli_dbgmsg("asn1_expect_hash_algo: expected NULL after AlgorithmIdentifier OID\n");

         return ret;
     }

     if (avail) {

         cli_dbgmsg("asn1_expect_hash_algo: extra data in AlgorithmIdentifier\n");
         return 1;
     }
     return 0;
 }
 

 static int asn1_expect_rsa(fmap_t *map, const void **asn1data, unsigned int *asn1len, cli_crt_hashtype *hashtype)
 {

     struct cli_asn1 obj;
     unsigned int avail;
     int ret;

     if ((ret = asn1_expect_objtype(map, *asn1data, asn1len, &obj, ASN1_TYPE_SEQUENCE))) { /* SEQUENCE */

         cli_dbgmsg("asn1_expect_rsa: expecting SEQUENCE at the start of the RSA algo\n");

         return ret;

     }

     avail     = obj.size;

     *asn1data = obj.next;
 

     if (asn1_expect_objtype(map, obj.content, &avail, &obj, ASN1_TYPE_OBJECT_ID)) {

         cli_dbgmsg("asn1_expect_rsa: expected OID in RSA algo\n");

         return 1;

     }

 
     // Two cases to check for:
     // obj.size == 5:
     //  - OID_sha1WithRSA
     //
     // obj.size == 9:

     //  - OID_rsaEncryption

     //  - OID_md2WithRSAEncryption
     //  - OID_md5WithRSAEncryption
     //  - OID_sha1WithRSAEncryption
     //  - OID_sha256WithRSAEncryption
     //  - OID_sha384WithRSAEncryption
     //  - OID_sha512WithRSAEncryption

     if (obj.size != lenof(OID_sha1WithRSA) && obj.size != lenof(OID_sha1WithRSAEncryption)) {

         cli_dbgmsg("asn1_expect_rsa: expecting OID with size 5 or 9, got %02x with size %u\n", obj.type, obj.size);
         return 1;

     }

     if (!fmap_need_ptr_once(map, obj.content, obj.size)) {

         cli_dbgmsg("asn1_expect_rsa: failed to read OID\n");
         return 1;

     }

     if (obj.size == lenof(OID_sha1WithRSA)) {

         if (!memcmp(obj.content, OID_sha1WithRSA, lenof(OID_sha1WithRSA))) {

             *hashtype = CLI_SHA1RSA; /* Obsolete sha1rsa 1.3.14.3.2.29 */

         } else {

             cli_dbgmsg("asn1_expect_rsa: unknown OID (length 5)\n");
             return 1;
         }

 
     } else if (obj.size == lenof(OID_sha1WithRSAEncryption)) {
 

         if (!memcmp(obj.content, OID_sha1WithRSAEncryption, lenof(OID_sha1WithRSAEncryption)))

             *hashtype = CLI_SHA1RSA; /* sha1withRSAEncryption 1.2.840.113549.1.1.5 */
 

         else if (!memcmp(obj.content, OID_md5WithRSAEncryption, lenof(OID_md5WithRSAEncryption)))

             *hashtype = CLI_MD5RSA; /* md5withRSAEncryption 1.2.840.113549.1.1.4 */
 

         else if (!memcmp(obj.content, OID_rsaEncryption, lenof(OID_rsaEncryption)))

             *hashtype = CLI_RSA; /* rsaEncryption 1.2.840.113549.1.1.1 */
 

         else if (!memcmp(obj.content, OID_md2WithRSAEncryption, lenof(OID_md2WithRSAEncryption))) {

             *hashtype = CLI_MD2RSA; /* md2withRSAEncryption 1.2.840.113549.1.1.2 */

         } else if (!memcmp(obj.content, OID_sha256WithRSAEncryption, lenof(OID_sha256WithRSAEncryption))) {

             *hashtype = CLI_SHA256RSA; /* sha256WithRSAEncryption 1.2.840.113549.1.1.11 */

         } else if (!memcmp(obj.content, OID_sha384WithRSAEncryption, lenof(OID_sha384WithRSAEncryption))) {

             *hashtype = CLI_SHA384RSA; /* sha384WithRSAEncryption 1.2.840.113549.1.1.12 */

         } else if (!memcmp(obj.content, OID_sha512WithRSAEncryption, lenof(OID_sha512WithRSAEncryption))) {

             *hashtype = CLI_SHA512RSA; /* sha512WithRSAEncryption 1.2.840.113549.1.1.13 */

         } else {

             cli_dbgmsg("asn1_expect_rsa: unknown OID (length 9)\n");

             return 1;
         }

     } else {

         cli_dbgmsg("asn1_expect_rsa: OID mismatch (size %u)\n", obj.size);
         return 1;

     }

     // The specification says that the NULL is a required parameter for this
     // data type, but in practice it doesn't always exist in the ASN1. If
     // there is something after the ALGO OID, assume it's the NULL

     if (avail && (ret = asn1_expect_obj(map, &obj.next, &avail, ASN1_TYPE_NULL, 0, NULL))) { /* NULL */

         cli_dbgmsg("asn1_expect_rsa: expected NULL following RSA OID\n");

         return ret;

     }

     if (avail) {

         cli_dbgmsg("asn1_expect_rsa: extra data found in SEQUENCE\n");
         return 1;

     }
     return 0;
 }
 

 static int asn1_getnum(const char *s)
 {
     if (s[0] < '0' || s[0] > '9' || s[1] < '0' || s[1] > '9') {

         cli_dbgmsg("asn1_getnum: expecting digits, found '%c%c'\n", s[0], s[1]);
         return -1;

     }

     return (s[0] - '0') * 10 + (s[1] - '0');

 }
 

 static int asn1_get_time(fmap_t *map, const void **asn1data, unsigned int *size, time_t *tm)
 {

     struct cli_asn1 obj;
     int ret = asn1_get_obj(map, *asn1data, size, &obj);
     unsigned int len;
     char *ptr;
     struct tm t;
     int n;
 

     if (ret)

         return ret;

     if (obj.type == 0x17) /* UTCTime - YYMMDDHHMMSSZ */

         len = 13;

     else if (obj.type == 0x18) /* GeneralizedTime - YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ */

         len = 15;

     else {

         cli_dbgmsg("asn1_get_time: expected UTCTime or GeneralizedTime, got %02x\n", obj.type);
         return 1;

     }

     if (!fmap_need_ptr_once(map, obj.content, len)) {

         cli_dbgmsg("asn1_get_time: failed to read content\n");
         return 1;

     }

 
     memset(&t, 0, sizeof(t));
     ptr = (char *)obj.content;

     if (obj.type == 0x18) {

         t.tm_year = asn1_getnum(ptr) * 100;

         if (t.tm_year < 0)

             return 1;
         n = asn1_getnum(ptr);

         if (n < 0)

             return 1;
         t.tm_year += n;

         ptr += 4;

     } else {

         n = asn1_getnum(ptr);

         if (n < 0)

             return 1;

         if (n >= 50)

             t.tm_year = 1900 + n;
         else
             t.tm_year = 2000 + n;
         ptr += 2;

     }

     t.tm_year -= 1900;

     n = asn1_getnum(ptr);

     if (n < 1 || n > 12) {

         cli_dbgmsg("asn1_get_time: invalid month %u\n", n);
         return 1;

     }

     t.tm_mon = n - 1;

     ptr += 2;

     n = asn1_getnum(ptr);

     if (n < 1 || n > 31) {

         cli_dbgmsg("asn1_get_time: invalid day %u\n", n);
         return 1;

     }

     t.tm_mday = n;

     ptr += 2;

     n = asn1_getnum(ptr);

     if (n < 0 || n > 23) {

         cli_dbgmsg("asn1_get_time: invalid hour %u\n", n);
         return 1;

     }

     t.tm_hour = n;

     ptr += 2;

     n = asn1_getnum(ptr);

     if (n < 0 || n > 59) {

         cli_dbgmsg("asn1_get_time: invalid minute %u\n", n);
         return 1;

     }

     t.tm_min = n;

     ptr += 2;

     n = asn1_getnum(ptr);

     if (n < 0 || n > 59) {

         cli_dbgmsg("asn1_get_time: invalid second %u\n", n);
         return 1;

     }

     t.tm_sec = n;

     ptr += 2;

     if (*ptr != 'Z') {

         cli_dbgmsg("asn1_get_time: expected UTC time 'Z', got '%c'\n", *ptr);
         return 1;

     }

     *tm       = mktime(&t);

     *asn1data = obj.next;
     return 0;
 }
 

 static int asn1_get_rsa_pubkey(fmap_t *map, const void **asn1data, unsigned int *size, cli_crt *x509)
 {

     struct cli_asn1 obj;
     unsigned int avail, avail2;
 

     if (asn1_expect_objtype(map, *asn1data, size, &obj, ASN1_TYPE_SEQUENCE)) /* subjectPublicKeyInfo */

         return 1;

     *asn1data = obj.next;
 
     avail = obj.size;

     if (asn1_expect_algo(map, &obj.content, &avail, lenof(OID_rsaEncryption), OID_rsaEncryption)) { /* rsaEncryption */
         cli_dbgmsg("asn1_get_rsa_pubkey: AlgorithmIdentifier other than RSA not yet supported\n");
         return 1;

     }

     if (asn1_expect_objtype(map, obj.content, &avail, &obj, ASN1_TYPE_BIT_STRING)) /* BIT STRING - subjectPublicKey */

         return 1;

     if (avail) {

         cli_dbgmsg("asn1_get_rsa_pubkey: found unexpected extra data in subjectPublicKeyInfo\n");
         return 1;

     }

     /* if(obj.size != 141 && obj.size != 271) /\* encoded len of 1024 and 2048 bit public keys *\/ */

     /*  return 1; */

     if (!fmap_need_ptr_once(map, obj.content, 1)) {

         cli_dbgmsg("asn1_get_rsa_pubkey: cannot read public key content\n");
         return 1;

     }

     if (((uint8_t *)obj.content)[0] != 0) { /* no byte fragments */

         cli_dbgmsg("asn1_get_rsa_pubkey: unexpected byte frags in public key\n");
         return 1;

     }

     avail       = obj.size - 1;

     obj.content = ((uint8_t *)obj.content) + 1;

     if (asn1_expect_objtype(map, obj.content, &avail, &obj, ASN1_TYPE_SEQUENCE)) /* SEQUENCE */

         return 1;

     if (avail) {

         cli_dbgmsg("asn1_get_rsa_pubkey: found unexpected extra data in public key content\n");
         return 1;

     }

 
     avail = obj.size;

     if (asn1_expect_objtype(map, obj.content, &avail, &obj, ASN1_TYPE_INTEGER)) /* INTEGER - mod */

         return 1;

     if (obj.size < 1024 / 8 || obj.size > 4096 / 8 + 1) {
         cli_dbgmsg("asn1_get_rsa_pubkey: modulus has got an unsupported length (%u)\n", obj.size * 8);

         return 1;

     }

     avail2 = obj.size;

     if (!fmap_need_ptr_once(map, obj.content, avail2)) {

         cli_dbgmsg("asn1_get_rsa_pubkey: cannot read n\n");
         return 1;

     }

     if (mp_read_unsigned_bin(&x509->n, obj.content, avail2)) {

         cli_dbgmsg("asn1_get_rsa_pubkey: cannot convert n to big number\n");
         return 1;

     }

     if (asn1_expect_objtype(map, obj.next, &avail, &obj, ASN1_TYPE_INTEGER)) /* INTEGER - exp */

         return 1;

     if (avail) {

         cli_dbgmsg("asn1_get_rsa_pubkey: found unexpected extra data after exp\n");
         return 1;

     }

     if (obj.size < 1 || obj.size > avail2) {
         cli_dbgmsg("asn1_get_rsa_pubkey: exponent has got an unsupported length (%u)\n", obj.size * 8);

         return 1;

     }

     if (!fmap_need_ptr_once(map, obj.content, obj.size)) {

         cli_dbgmsg("asn1_get_rsa_pubkey: cannot read e\n");
         return 1;

     }

     if (mp_read_unsigned_bin(&x509->e, obj.content, obj.size)) {

         cli_dbgmsg("asn1_get_rsa_pubkey: cannot convert e to big number\n");
         return 1;

     }

     return 0;
 }
 

 #define ASN1_GET_X509_SUCCESS 0
 #define ASN1_GET_X509_CERT_ERROR 1
 #define ASN1_GET_X509_UNRECOVERABLE_ERROR 2
 

 /* Parse the asn1data associated with an x509 certificate and add the cert

  * to the crtmgr certs if it doesn't already exist there.

  * ASN1_GET_X509_CERT_ERROR will be returned in the case that an invalid x509
  * certificate is encountered but asn1data and size are suitable for continued
  * signature parsing.  ASN1_GET_X509_UNRECOVERABLE_ERROR will be returned in
  * the case where asn1data and size are not suitable for continued use. */

 static int asn1_get_x509(fmap_t *map, const void **asn1data, unsigned int *size, crtmgr *crts)
 {

     struct cli_asn1 crt, tbs, obj;

     unsigned int avail, tbssize, issuersize;

     cli_crt_hashtype hashtype1, hashtype2;

     cli_crt x509;

     const uint8_t *tbsdata;

     const void *next, *issuer;

     int ret = ASN1_GET_X509_UNRECOVERABLE_ERROR;

     unsigned int version;

     if (cli_crt_init(&x509))

         return ret;

     do {

         if (asn1_expect_objtype(map, *asn1data, size, &crt, ASN1_TYPE_SEQUENCE)) { /* SEQUENCE */

             cli_dbgmsg("asn1_get_x509: expected SEQUENCE at the x509 start\n");

             break;

         }

         *asn1data = crt.next;
 

         /* After this point, an error is recoverable because asn1data and size
          * will be suitable for continued use by the caller, so change ret */
         ret = ASN1_GET_X509_CERT_ERROR;
 

         tbsdata = crt.content;

         if (asn1_expect_objtype(map, crt.content, &crt.size, &tbs, ASN1_TYPE_SEQUENCE)) { /* SEQUENCE - TBSCertificate */

             cli_dbgmsg("asn1_get_x509: expected SEQUENCE at the TBSCertificate start\n");

             break;

         }

         tbssize = (uint8_t *)tbs.next - tbsdata;
 

         /* The version field of the x509 certificate is optional, defaulting
          * to 1 if the field is not present.  Version 3 is backward compatible,
          * adding the optional issuerUniqueID, sujectUniqueID, and extensions
          * fields.  We'll try to handle both cases, since the Windows API
          * appears to allow for both (despite the fact that the 2008 spec doc
          * says that v3 certificates are used for everything) */
 
         if (asn1_get_obj(map, tbs.content, &tbs.size, &obj)) {
             cli_dbgmsg("asn1_get_x509: failed to get first item in the TBSCertificate\n");

             break;
         }

         if (0xa0 == obj.type) { /* [0] */

             avail = obj.size;

             next  = obj.next;

             // TODO Should we support v2 certs?  Supposedly they are not widely used...

             if (asn1_expect_obj(map, &obj.content, &avail, ASN1_TYPE_INTEGER, 1, "\x02")) { /* version 3 only (indicated by '\x02')*/

                 cli_dbgmsg("asn1_get_x509: unexpected type or value for TBSCertificate version\n");
                 break;
             }

             if (avail) {

                 cli_dbgmsg("asn1_get_x509: found unexpected extra data in version\n");
                 break;
             }
             version = 3;

             if (asn1_expect_objtype(map, next, &tbs.size, &obj, ASN1_TYPE_INTEGER)) { /* serialNumber */

                 cli_dbgmsg("asn1_get_x509: expected x509 serial INTEGER\n");
                 break;
             }
         } else if (ASN1_TYPE_INTEGER == obj.type) {
             /* The version field is missing, so we'll assume that this is a
              * version 1 certificate.  obj points to the serialNumber
              * INTEGER, then, so just continue on to map it. */
             version = 1;
 
             /* v1 certificates don't have enough information to convey the
              * purpose of the certificate.  I've only ever seen these used
              * in the timestamp signing chain, so set the flags to indicate
              * that. */
             x509.certSign = 1;
             x509.codeSign = 0;
             x509.timeSign = 1;
 
         } else {
             cli_dbgmsg("asn1_get_x509: expected version or serialNumber as the first item in TBSCertificate\n");

             break;

         }

         if (map_raw(map, obj.content, obj.size, x509.raw_serial))

             break;

         if (map_sha1(map, obj.content, obj.size, x509.serial))

             break;
 

         if (asn1_expect_rsa(map, &obj.next, &tbs.size, &hashtype1)) { /* algo - Ex: sha1WithRSAEncryption */

             cli_dbgmsg("asn1_get_x509: unable to parse AlgorithmIdentifier\n");

             break;

         }

         if (asn1_expect_objtype(map, obj.next, &tbs.size, &obj, ASN1_TYPE_SEQUENCE)) { /* issuer */

             cli_dbgmsg("asn1_get_x509: expected SEQUENCE when parsing cert issuer\n");

             break;

         }

         issuer     = obj.content;

         issuersize = obj.size;
 

         if (asn1_expect_objtype(map, obj.next, &tbs.size, &obj, ASN1_TYPE_SEQUENCE)) { /* validity */

             cli_dbgmsg("asn1_get_x509: expected SEQUENCE when parsing cert validity\n");

             break;

         }

         avail = obj.size;

         next  = obj.content;

         if (asn1_get_time(map, &next, &avail, &x509.not_before)) { /* notBefore */

             cli_dbgmsg("asn1_get_x509: unable to extract the notBefore time\n");

             break;

         }

         if (asn1_get_time(map, &next, &avail, &x509.not_after)) { /* notAfter */

             cli_dbgmsg("asn1_get_x509: unable to extract the notAfter time\n");

             break;

         }

         if (x509.not_before >= x509.not_after) {

             cli_dbgmsg("asn1_get_x509: bad validity\n");
             break;
         }

         if (avail) {

             cli_dbgmsg("asn1_get_x509: found unexpected extra data in validity\n");
             break;
         }
 

         if (asn1_expect_objtype(map, obj.next, &tbs.size, &obj, ASN1_TYPE_SEQUENCE)) { /* subject */

             cli_dbgmsg("asn1_get_x509: expected SEQUENCE when parsing cert subject\n");

             break;

         }

         if (map_raw(map, obj.content, obj.size, x509.raw_subject))

             break;

         if (map_sha1(map, obj.content, obj.size, x509.subject))

             break;

         if (asn1_get_rsa_pubkey(map, &obj.next, &tbs.size, &x509)) { /* subjectPublicKeyInfo */

             cli_dbgmsg("asn1_get_x509: failed to get RSA public key\n");

             break;

         }

 
         if (1 == version && tbs.size) {
             cli_dbgmsg("asn1_get_x509: TBSCertificate should not contain fields beyond subjectPublicKeyInfo if version == 1\n");

             break;

         }

 
         avail = 0;

         while (tbs.size) {
             if (asn1_get_obj(map, obj.next, &tbs.size, &obj)) {

                 tbs.size = 1;
                 break;
             }

             if (obj.type <= 0xa0 + avail || obj.type > 0xa3) {

                 cli_dbgmsg("asn1_get_x509: found type %02x in extensions, expecting a1, a2 or a3\n", obj.type);
                 tbs.size = 1;
                 break;
             }
             avail = obj.type - 0xa0;

             if (obj.type == 0xa3) {

                 struct cli_asn1 exts;

                 int have_key_usage = 0;

                 int have_ext_key   = 0;
                 if (asn1_expect_objtype(map, obj.content, &obj.size, &exts, ASN1_TYPE_SEQUENCE)) {

                     tbs.size = 1;
                     break;
                 }

                 if (obj.size) {

                     cli_dbgmsg("asn1_get_x509: found unexpected extra data in extensions\n");
                     break;
                 }

                 while (exts.size) {

                     struct cli_asn1 ext, id, value;

                     if (asn1_expect_objtype(map, exts.content, &exts.size, &ext, ASN1_TYPE_SEQUENCE)) {

                         exts.size = 1;
                         break;
                     }
                     exts.content = ext.next;

                     if (asn1_expect_objtype(map, ext.content, &ext.size, &id, ASN1_TYPE_OBJECT_ID)) {

                         exts.size = 1;
                         break;
                     }

                     if (asn1_get_obj(map, id.next, &ext.size, &value)) {

                         exts.size = 1;
                         break;
                     }

                     if (value.type == ASN1_TYPE_BOOLEAN) {

                         /* critical flag */

                         if (value.size != 1) {

                             cli_dbgmsg("asn1_get_x509: found boolean with wrong length\n");
                             exts.size = 1;
                             break;
                         }

                         if (asn1_get_obj(map, value.next, &ext.size, &value)) {

                             exts.size = 1;
                             break;
                         }
                     }

                     if (value.type != ASN1_TYPE_OCTET_STRING) {

                         cli_dbgmsg("asn1_get_x509: bad extension value type %u\n", value.type);
                         exts.size = 1;
                         break;
                     }

                     if (ext.size) {

                         cli_dbgmsg("asn1_get_x509: extra data in extension\n");
                         exts.size = 1;
                         break;
                     }

                     if (id.size != 3)

                         continue;
 

                     if (!fmap_need_ptr_once(map, id.content, 3)) {

                         exts.size = 1;
                         break;
                     }

                     if (!memcmp("\x55\x1d\x0f", id.content, 3)) {

                         /* KeyUsage 2.5.29.15 */
                         const uint8_t *keyusage = value.content;
                         uint8_t usage;

                         have_key_usage = 1;

                         if (value.size < 4 || value.size > 5) {

                             cli_dbgmsg("asn1_get_x509: bad KeyUsage\n");
                             exts.size = 1;
                             break;
                         }

                         if (!fmap_need_ptr_once(map, value.content, value.size)) {

                             exts.size = 1;
                             break;
                         }

                         if (keyusage[0] != 0x03 || keyusage[1] != value.size - 2 || keyusage[2] > 7) {

                             cli_dbgmsg("asn1_get_x509: bad KeyUsage\n");
                             exts.size = 1;
                             break;
                         }
                         usage = keyusage[3];

                         if (value.size == 4)
                             usage &= ~((1 << keyusage[2]) - 1);

                         x509.certSign = ((usage & 4) != 0);
                         continue;
                     }

                     if (!memcmp("\x55\x1d\x25", id.content, 3)) {

                         /* ExtKeyUsage 2.5.29.37 */
                         struct cli_asn1 keypurp;
                         have_ext_key = 1;

                         if (asn1_expect_objtype(map, value.content, &value.size, &keypurp, ASN1_TYPE_SEQUENCE)) {

                             exts.size = 1;
                             break;
                         }

                         if (value.size) {

                             cli_dbgmsg("asn1_get_x509: extra data in ExtKeyUsage\n");
                             exts.size = 1;
                             break;
                         }
                         ext.next = keypurp.content;

                         while (keypurp.size) {
                             if (asn1_expect_objtype(map, ext.next, &keypurp.size, &ext, ASN1_TYPE_OBJECT_ID)) {

                                 exts.size = 1;
                                 break;
                             }

                             if (ext.size != 8 && ext.size != 10)

                                 continue;

                             if (!fmap_need_ptr_once(map, ext.content, ext.size)) {

                                 exts.size = 1;
                                 break;
                             }

                             if (!memcmp("\x2b\x06\x01\x05\x05\x07\x03\x03", ext.content, 8)) /* id_kp_codeSigning */

                                 x509.codeSign = 1;

                             else if (!memcmp("\x2b\x06\x01\x05\x05\x07\x03\x08", ext.content, 8)) /* id_kp_timeStamping */

                                 x509.timeSign = 1;

                             else if (!memcmp("\x2b\x06\x01\x04\x01\x82\x37\x0a\x03\x0d", ext.content, 10)) /* id_kp_lifetimeSigning */

                                 cli_dbgmsg("asn1_get_x509: lifetime signing specified but enforcing this is not currently supported\n");

                         }
                         continue;
                     }

                     if (!memcmp("\x55\x1d\x13", id.content, 3)) {

                         /* Basic Constraints 2.5.29.19 */
                         struct cli_asn1 constr;

                         if (asn1_expect_objtype(map, value.content, &value.size, &constr, ASN1_TYPE_SEQUENCE)) {

                             exts.size = 1;
                             break;
                         }

                         if (!constr.size)

                             x509.certSign = 0;
                         else {

                             if (asn1_expect_objtype(map, constr.content, &constr.size, &ext, ASN1_TYPE_BOOLEAN)) {

                                 exts.size = 1;
                                 break;
                             }

                             if (ext.size != 1) {

                                 cli_dbgmsg("asn1_get_x509: wrong bool size in basic constraint %u\n", ext.size);
                                 exts.size = 1;
                                 break;
                             }

                             if (!fmap_need_ptr_once(map, ext.content, 1)) {

                                 exts.size = 1;
                                 break;
                             }
                             x509.certSign = (((uint8_t *)(ext.content))[0] != 0);
                         }
                     }
                 }

                 if (exts.size) {

                     tbs.size = 1;
                     break;
                 }

 
                 /* The 2008 spec doc says that for a certificate to be used for
                  * code signing, it must either have an EKU indicating code
                  * signing or the entire certificate chain must not have any
                  * EKUs.
                  * TODO We should actually enforce that last check.
                  * For time stamping, the doc says the EKU must be present, and
                  * makes no exception for EKUs being missing.
                  * TODO Should we not set timeSign = 1 in this case, then? */

                 if (!have_ext_key)

                     x509.codeSign = x509.timeSign = 1;

 
                 /* RFC 3280 section 4.2.1.3 says that if a certificate is
                  * used to validate digital signatures on other public key
                  * certificates, it MUST have a key usage extension with the
                  * appropriate bits set.  However, the MS MD5 root authority
                  * certificate (A43489159A520F0D93D032CCAF37E7FE20A8B419)
                  * doesn't have a KU or any EKUs, and PEs with it in the
                  * chain validate successfully.
                  * TODO Flip the certSign bit for now, but revisit if
                  * a clarification on this becomes available */

                 if (!have_key_usage)

                     x509.certSign = 1;

             }
         }

         if (tbs.size) {

             cli_dbgmsg("asn1_get_x509: An error occurred when parsing x509 extensions\n");

             break;

         }

         if (!x509.certSign && !x509.codeSign && !x509.timeSign) {
             cli_dbgmsg("asn1_get_x509: encountered a certificate with no cert, code, or time signing capabilities\n");
         }
 

         if (map_raw(map, issuer, issuersize, x509.raw_issuer))

             break;

         if (map_sha1(map, issuer, issuersize, x509.issuer))

             break;
 

         if (asn1_expect_rsa(map, &tbs.next, &crt.size, &hashtype2)) /* signature algo - Ex: sha1WithRSAEncryption */

             break;
 

         if (hashtype1 != hashtype2) {

             cli_dbgmsg("asn1_get_x509: found conflicting RSA hash types\n");

             break;
         }
         x509.hashtype = hashtype1;
 

         if (crtmgr_lookup(crts, &x509)) {
             cli_dbgmsg("asn1_get_x509: duplicate embedded certificates detected\n");
             cli_crt_clear(&x509);
             return ASN1_GET_X509_SUCCESS;
         }
 

         if (asn1_expect_objtype(map, tbs.next, &crt.size, &obj, ASN1_TYPE_BIT_STRING)) { /* signature */

             cli_dbgmsg("asn1_get_x509: Failed to parse x509 signature BIT STRING\n");

             break;

         }

         if (obj.size > 513) {

             cli_dbgmsg("asn1_get_x509: signature too long\n");
             break;
         }

         if (!fmap_need_ptr_once(map, obj.content, obj.size)) {

             cli_dbgmsg("asn1_get_x509: cannot read signature\n");
             break;
         }

         if (mp_read_unsigned_bin(&x509.sig, obj.content, obj.size)) {

             cli_dbgmsg("asn1_get_x509: cannot convert signature to big number\n");
             break;
         }

         if (crt.size) {

             cli_dbgmsg("asn1_get_x509: found unexpected extra data in signature\n");
             break;
         }
 

         if (map_hash(map, tbsdata, tbssize, x509.tbshash, x509.hashtype)) {

             cli_dbgmsg("asn1_get_x509: Unsupported hashtype or hash computation failed\n");

             break;

         }

         if (crtmgr_add(crts, &x509))

             break;
         cli_crt_clear(&x509);

         return ASN1_GET_X509_SUCCESS;

     } while (0);

     cli_crt_clear(&x509);

     return ret;

 }
 

 static int asn1_parse_countersignature(fmap_t *map, const void **asn1data, unsigned int *size, crtmgr *cmgr, const uint8_t *message, const unsigned int message_size, time_t not_before, time_t not_after)
 {

 
     struct cli_asn1 asn1, deep, deeper;
     uint8_t issuer[SHA1_HASH_SIZE], serial[SHA1_HASH_SIZE];
     const uint8_t *attrs;
     unsigned int dsize, attrs_size;
     unsigned int avail;

     uint8_t hash[MAX_HASH_SIZE];

     cli_crt_hashtype hashtype;

     cli_crt_hashtype hashtype2;

     unsigned int hashsize;

     uint8_t md[MAX_HASH_SIZE];

     int result;
     void *ctx;
 
     do {

         if (asn1_expect_objtype(map, *asn1data, size, &asn1, ASN1_TYPE_SEQUENCE)) {

             cli_dbgmsg("asn1_parse_countersignature: expected SEQUENCE inside counterSignature SET\n");

             break;
         }
 
         avail = asn1.size;

 
         if (asn1_expect_objtype(map, asn1.content, &avail, &deep, ASN1_TYPE_INTEGER)) {
             cli_dbgmsg("asn1_parse_countersignature: expected INTEGER for counterSignature version");
             break;
         }
 

         if (deep.size != 1) {

             cli_dbgmsg("asn1_parse_countersignature: expected INTEGER of size 1, got size %u\n", deep.size);
             break;
         }
 

         if (!fmap_need_ptr_once(map, deep.content, 1)) {

             cli_dbgmsg("asn1_parse_countersignature: failed to read version\n");
             break;
         }
         /* Allow either '0' or '1' for the version. The specification says
          * that this field must be 1, but some binaries have 0 here and
          * they appear to validate just fine via the Windows API */

         if (memcmp(deep.content, "\x01", 1) && memcmp(deep.content, "\x00", 1)) {

             cli_dbgmsg("asn1_parse_countersignature: counterSignature version is not 1 or 0\n");

             break;
         }

         asn1.content = deep.next;

         if (asn1_expect_objtype(map, asn1.content, &avail, &asn1, ASN1_TYPE_SEQUENCE)) { /* issuerAndSerialNumber */

             cli_dbgmsg("asn1_parse_countersignature: unable to parse issuerAndSerialNumber SEQUENCE in counterSignature\n");

             break;
         }
 

         if (asn1_expect_objtype(map, asn1.content, &asn1.size, &deep, ASN1_TYPE_SEQUENCE)) { /* issuer */

             cli_dbgmsg("asn1_parse_countersignature: unable to parse issuer SEQUENCE in counterSignature\n");

             break;
         }
         // Compute the hash of the issuer section

         if (map_sha1(map, deep.content, deep.size, issuer)) {

             cli_dbgmsg("asn1_parse_countersignature: error in call to map_sha1 for counterSignature issuer\n");

             break;
         }
 

         if (asn1_expect_objtype(map, deep.next, &asn1.size, &deep, ASN1_TYPE_INTEGER)) { /* serial */

             cli_dbgmsg("asn1_parse_countersignature: expected ASN1_TYPE_INTEGER serial for counterSignature\n");

             break;
         }
 
         // Compute the hash of the serial INTEGER

         if (map_sha1(map, deep.content, deep.size, serial)) {

             cli_dbgmsg("asn1_parse_countersignature: error in call to map_sha1 for counterSignature serial\n");

             break;
         }
 

         if (asn1.size) {

             cli_dbgmsg("asn1_parse_countersignature: extra data inside counterSignature issuer\n");

             break;
         }
 

         if (asn1_expect_hash_algo(map, &asn1.next, &avail, &hashtype, &hashsize)) {

             cli_dbgmsg("asn1_parse_countersignature: error parsing counterSignature digestAlgorithm\n");

             break;
         }

         if (map_hash(map, message, message_size, md, hashtype)) {

             cli_dbgmsg("asn1_parse_countersignature: failed to map in message/compute countersignature hash\n");

             break;
         }
 
         attrs = asn1.next;

         if (asn1_expect_objtype(map, asn1.next, &avail, &asn1, 0xa0)) { /* authenticatedAttributes */

             cli_dbgmsg("asn1_parse_countersignature: unable to parse counterSignature authenticatedAttributes section\n");

             break;
         }
         attrs_size = (uint8_t *)(asn1.next) - attrs;

         if (asn1.next == NULL && attrs_size < 2) {

             cli_dbgmsg("asn1_parse_countersignature: counterSignature authenticatedAttributes are too small\n");

             break;
         }

         result    = 0;
         dsize     = asn1.size;

         deep.next = asn1.content;

         while (dsize) {

             int content;

             if (asn1_expect_objtype(map, deep.next, &dsize, &deep, ASN1_TYPE_SEQUENCE)) { /* attribute */

                 cli_dbgmsg("asn1_parse_countersignature: expected counterSignature attribute SEQUENCE\n");

                 dsize = 1;
                 break;
             }

             if (asn1_expect_objtype(map, deep.content, &deep.size, &deeper, ASN1_TYPE_OBJECT_ID)) { /* attribute type */

                 cli_dbgmsg("asn1_parse_countersignature: expected attribute type inside counterSignature attribute SEQUENCE\n");

                 dsize = 1;
                 break;
             }

             if (deeper.size != lenof(OID_contentType)) /* lenof(contentType) = lenof(messageDigest) = lenof(signingTime) = 9 */

                 continue;
 

             if (!fmap_need_ptr_once(map, deeper.content, lenof(OID_contentType))) {

                 cli_dbgmsg("asn1_parse_countersignature: failed to read counterSignature authenticated attribute\n");

                 dsize = 1;
                 break;
             }

             if (!memcmp(deeper.content, OID_contentType, lenof(OID_contentType)))

                 content = 0; /* contentType */

             else if (!memcmp(deeper.content, OID_messageDigest, lenof(OID_messageDigest)))

                 content = 1; /* messageDigest */

             else if (!memcmp(deeper.content, OID_signingTime, lenof(OID_signingTime)))

                 content = 2; /* signingTime */
             else
                 continue;

             if (result & (1 << content)) {

                 cli_dbgmsg("asn1_parse_countersignature: duplicate field in countersignature\n");

                 dsize = 1;
                 break;
             }

             result |= (1 << content);
             if (asn1_expect_objtype(map, deeper.next, &deep.size, &deeper, ASN1_TYPE_SET)) { /* set - contents */

                 cli_dbgmsg("asn1_parse_countersignature: failed to read counterSignature authenticated attribute\n");

                 dsize = 1;
                 break;
             }

             if (deep.size) {

                 cli_dbgmsg("asn1_parse_countersignature: extra data in countersignature value\n");

                 dsize = 1;
                 break;
             }
             deep.size = deeper.size;

             switch (content) {
                 case 0: { /* contentType = pkcs7-data */
                     const void *backupPtr   = deeper.content;
                     unsigned int backupSize = deep.size;
                     if (asn1_expect_obj(map, &deeper.content, &deep.size, ASN1_TYPE_OBJECT_ID, lenof(OID_pkcs7_data), OID_pkcs7_data)) {
                         cli_dbgmsg("asn1_parse_countersignature: contentType != pkcs7-data, checking for timestampToken instead\n");
                         /* Some signatures use OID_timestampToken instead, so allow

                      * that also (despite the 2008 spec saying that this value
                      * must be pkcs7-data) */

                         deeper.content = backupPtr;
                         deep.size      = backupSize;
                         if (asn1_expect_obj(map, &deeper.content, &deep.size, ASN1_TYPE_OBJECT_ID, lenof(OID_timestampToken), OID_timestampToken)) {
                             cli_dbgmsg("asn1_parse_countersignature: contentType != timestampToken\n");
                             deep.size = 1;
                             break;
                         }

                     }
 

                     if (deep.size)
                         cli_dbgmsg("asn1_parse_countersignature: extra data in countersignature content-type\n");
                     break;
                 }
                 case 1: /* messageDigest */
                     if (asn1_expect_obj(map, &deeper.content, &deep.size, ASN1_TYPE_OCTET_STRING, hashsize, md)) {
                         deep.size = 1;
                         cli_dbgmsg("asn1_parse_countersignature: countersignature hash mismatch\n");
                     } else if (deep.size)
                         cli_dbgmsg("asn1_parse_countersignature: extra data in countersignature message-digest\n");
                     break;
                 case 2: /* signingTime */

                 {
                     time_t sigdate; /* FIXME shall i use it?! */

                     if (asn1_get_time(map, &deeper.content, &deep.size, &sigdate)) {

                         cli_dbgmsg("asn1_parse_countersignature: an error occurred when getting the time\n");

                         deep.size = 1;

                     } else if (deep.size)

                         cli_dbgmsg("asn1_parse_countersignature: extra data in countersignature signing-time\n");

                     else if (sigdate < not_before || sigdate > not_after) {

                         cli_dbgmsg("asn1_parse_countersignature: countersignature timestamp outside cert validity\n");

                         deep.size = 1;
                     }
                     break;
                 }
             }

             if (deep.size) {

                 dsize = 1;
                 break;
             }
         }

         if (dsize)

             break;

         if (result != 7) {

             cli_dbgmsg("asn1_parse_countersignature: some important attributes are missing in countersignature\n");

             break;
         }
 

         // TODO For some reason there tends to be more variability here than
         // when parsing the regular signature - we have to support at least
         // szOID_RSA_RSA and szOID_RSA_SHA1RSA based on samples seen in the
         // wild.  The spec says this should only be the RSA and DSA OIDs,
         // though.
         if (asn1_expect_rsa(map, &asn1.next, &avail, &hashtype2)) {
             cli_dbgmsg("asn1_parse_countersignature: unable to parse the digestEncryptionAlgorithm\n");

             break;
         }

 
         if (hashtype2 != CLI_RSA && hashtype2 != hashtype) {
             cli_dbgmsg("asn1_parse_countersignature: digestEncryptionAlgorithm conflicts with digestAlgorithm\n");

             break;
         }
 

         if (asn1_expect_objtype(map, asn1.next, &avail, &asn1, ASN1_TYPE_OCTET_STRING)) { /* encryptedDigest */

             cli_dbgmsg("asn1_parse_countersignature: unexpected encryptedDigest value in counterSignature\n");

             break;
         }

         if (asn1.size > 513) {

             cli_dbgmsg("asn1_parse_countersignature: countersignature encryptedDigest too long\n");

             break;
         }

         if (avail) {

             cli_dbgmsg("asn1_parse_countersignature: extra data inside countersignature\n");

             break;
         }

         if (!fmap_need_ptr_once(map, attrs, attrs_size)) {

             cli_dbgmsg("asn1_parse_countersignature: failed to read authenticatedAttributes\n");

             break;
         }
 

         if (NULL == (ctx = get_hash_ctx(hashtype))) {

             break;
         }
 
         cl_update_hash(ctx, "\x31", 1);
         cl_update_hash(ctx, (void *)(attrs + 1), attrs_size - 1);
         cl_finish_hash(ctx, hash);
 

         if (!fmap_need_ptr_once(map, asn1.content, asn1.size)) {

             cli_dbgmsg("asn1_parse_countersignature: failed to read countersignature encryptedDigest\n");

             break;
         }

         if (!crtmgr_verify_pkcs7(cmgr, issuer, serial, asn1.content, asn1.size, hashtype, hash, VRFY_TIME)) {

             cli_dbgmsg("asn1_parse_countersignature: pkcs7 countersignature verification failed\n");

             break;
         }
 

         cli_dbgmsg("asn1_parse_countersignature: countersignature verification completed successfully\n");

 
         return 0;
 

     } while (0);

 
     return 1;
 }
 

 static cl_error_t asn1_parse_mscat(struct cl_engine *engine, fmap_t *map, size_t offset, unsigned int size, crtmgr *cmgr, int embedded, const void **hashes, unsigned int *hashes_size, cli_ctx *ctx)

 {

     struct cli_asn1 asn1, deep, deeper;

     uint8_t issuer[SHA1_HASH_SIZE], serial[SHA1_HASH_SIZE];

     const uint8_t *message, *attrs;
     unsigned int dsize, message_size, attrs_size;

     // hash is used to hold the hashes we compute as part of sig verification

     uint8_t hash[MAX_HASH_SIZE];
     cli_crt_hashtype hashtype, hashtype2;

     unsigned int hashsize;

     // md is used to hold the message digest we extract from the signature

     uint8_t md[MAX_HASH_SIZE];

     cli_crt *x509;

     void *hash_ctx;

     int result;

     cl_error_t ret = CL_EPARSE;

     cli_dbgmsg("in asn1_parse_mscat\n");
 

     do {

         if (!(message = fmap_need_off_once(map, offset, 1))) {

             cli_dbgmsg("asn1_parse_mscat: failed to read pkcs#7 entry\n");
             break;
         }
 

         if (asn1_expect_objtype(map, message, &size, &asn1, ASN1_TYPE_SEQUENCE)) { /* SEQUENCE */

             cli_dbgmsg("asn1_parse_mscat: expected SEQUENCE at top level\n");

             break;

         }
 

         // Many signatures have zero bytes at the end (padding?)

         /* if(size) { */
         /*     cli_dbgmsg("asn1_parse_mscat: found extra data after pkcs#7 %u\n", size); */
         /*     break; */
         /* } */
         size = asn1.size;

         if (asn1_expect_obj(map, &asn1.content, &size, ASN1_TYPE_OBJECT_ID, lenof(OID_signedData), OID_signedData)) { /* OBJECT 1.2.840.113549.1.7.2 - contentType = signedData */

             cli_dbgmsg("asn1_parse_mscat: expected contentType == signedData\n");

             break;

         }

         if (asn1_expect_objtype(map, asn1.content, &size, &asn1, 0xa0)) { /* [0] - content */

             cli_dbgmsg("asn1_parse_mscat: expected '[0] - content' following signedData contentType\n");

             break;

         }

         if (size) {

             cli_dbgmsg("asn1_parse_mscat: found extra data in pkcs#7\n");
             break;
         }
         size = asn1.size;

         if (asn1_expect_objtype(map, asn1.content, &size, &asn1, ASN1_TYPE_SEQUENCE)) { /* SEQUENCE */

             cli_dbgmsg("asn1_parse_mscat: expected SEQUENCE inside signedData '[0] - content'\n");

             break;

         }

         if (size) {

             cli_dbgmsg("asn1_parse_mscat: found extra data in signedData\n");

             break;
         }

         size = asn1.size;

         if (asn1_expect_obj(map, &asn1.content, &size, ASN1_TYPE_INTEGER, 1, "\x01")) { /* INTEGER - VERSION 1 */

             cli_dbgmsg("asn1_parse_mscat: expected 'INTEGER - VERSION 1' for signedData version\n");

             break;

         }

         if (asn1_expect_objtype(map, asn1.content, &size, &asn1, ASN1_TYPE_SET)) { /* SET OF DigestAlgorithmIdentifier */

             cli_dbgmsg("asn1_parse_mscat: expected SET OF DigestAlgorithmIdentifier inside signedData\n");

             break;

         }

         // At this point asn1.next points to the SEQUENCE following the
         // DigestAlgorithmIdentifier SET, so we'll want to preserve it so
         // we can continue parsing laterally.  We also want to preserve
         // size, since it tracks how much is left in the SignedData section.

         if (asn1_expect_hash_algo(map, &asn1.content, &asn1.size, &hashtype, &hashsize)) {
             cli_dbgmsg("asn1_parse_mscat: error parsing SignedData digestAlgorithm\n");

             break;

         }

         if (asn1.size) {

             cli_dbgmsg("asn1_parse_mscat: found extra data in the SignerData digestAlgorithm SET\n");

             break;
         }
 
         // We've finished parsing the DigestAlgorithmIdentifiers SET, so start
         // back parsing the SignedData

         if (asn1_expect_objtype(map, asn1.next, &size, &asn1, ASN1_TYPE_SEQUENCE)) { /* SEQUENCE - contentInfo */

             cli_dbgmsg("asn1_parse_mscat: expected 'SEQUENCE - contentInfo' inside SignedData following DigestAlgorithmIdentifiers\n");

             break;

         }

         // Parse the contentInfo SEQUENCE.  asn1.next and size point to the
         // certificates, so these need to be preserved
 

         /* Here there is either a PKCS #7 ContentType Object Identifier for Certificate Trust List (szOID_CTL)
          * or a single SPC_INDIRECT_DATA_OBJID */

         if (
             (!embedded && asn1_expect_obj(map, &asn1.content, &asn1.size, ASN1_TYPE_OBJECT_ID, lenof(OID_szOID_CTL), OID_szOID_CTL)) ||
             (embedded && asn1_expect_obj(map, &asn1.content, &asn1.size, ASN1_TYPE_OBJECT_ID, lenof(OID_SPC_INDIRECT_DATA_OBJID), OID_SPC_INDIRECT_DATA_OBJID))) {

             cli_dbgmsg("asn1_parse_mscat: unexpected ContentType for embedded mode %d\n", embedded);

             break;

         }

         if (asn1_expect_objtype(map, asn1.content, &asn1.size, &deep, 0xa0)) {

             cli_dbgmsg("asn1_parse_mscat: expected '[0] - content' following DigestAlgorithmIdentifier contentType\n");

             break;

         }

         if (asn1.size) {

             cli_dbgmsg("asn1_parse_mscat: found extra data in contentInfo\n");
             break;
         }
         dsize = deep.size;

         if (asn1_expect_objtype(map, deep.content, &dsize, &deep, ASN1_TYPE_SEQUENCE)) {

             cli_dbgmsg("asn1_parse_mscat: expected SEQUENCE in DigestAlgorithmIdentifier '[0] - contentInfo'\n");

             break;

         }

         if (dsize) {

             cli_dbgmsg("asn1_parse_mscat: found extra data in content\n");
             break;
         }

 
         /*

          * Hashes should look like:

          * SEQUENCE(2 elem)
          *    OBJECT IDENTIFIER 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.2.1.15 spcPEImageData
          *    SEQUENCE(2 elem)
          *        BIT STRING(0 elem)
          *        [0](1 elem)
          *            [2](1 elem)
          *                [0]
          * SEQUENCE(2 elem)
          *    SEQUENCE(2 elem)
          *        OBJECT IDENTIFIER 1.3.14.3.2.26 sha1 (OIW)
          *        NULL
          *    OCTET STRING(20 byte)
          */
 

         *hashes      = deep.content;

         *hashes_size = deep.size;
 

         // Now resume parsing SignedData - certificates
 

         if (asn1_expect_objtype(map, asn1.next, &size, &asn1, 0xa0)) { /* certificates */

             cli_dbgmsg("asn1_parse_mscat: expected 0xa0 certificates entry\n");

             break;

         }

 
         dsize = asn1.size;

         if (dsize) {

             crtmgr newcerts;
             crtmgr_init(&newcerts);

             while (dsize) {

                 result = asn1_get_x509(map, &asn1.content, &dsize, &newcerts);

                 if (ASN1_GET_X509_UNRECOVERABLE_ERROR == result) {

                     dsize = 1;
                     break;

                 } else if (ASN1_GET_X509_CERT_ERROR == result) {

                     cli_dbgmsg("asn1_parse_mscat: skipping x509 certificate with errors\n");
                 }

             }

             if (dsize) {

                 crtmgr_free(&newcerts);

                 cli_dbgmsg("asn1_parse_mscat: an unrecoverable error occurred while extracting x509 certificates\n");

                 break;
             }

             if (newcerts.crts) {

                 x509 = newcerts.crts;

                 cli_dbgmsg("asn1_parse_mscat: %u embedded certificates collected\n", newcerts.items);
                 if (engine->engine_options & ENGINE_OPTIONS_PE_DUMPCERTS) {
                     /* Dump the certs if requested before anything happens to them */

                     while (x509) {
                         char raw_issuer[CRT_RAWMAXLEN * 2 + 1], raw_subject[CRT_RAWMAXLEN * 2 + 1], raw_serial[CRT_RAWMAXLEN * 3 + 1];
                         char issuer[SHA1_HASH_SIZE * 2 + 1], subject[SHA1_HASH_SIZE * 2 + 1], serial[SHA1_HASH_SIZE * 2 + 1];
                         char mod[1024 + 1], exp[1024 + 1];
                         int j = 1024;
 
                         fp_toradix_n(&x509->n, mod, 16, j + 1);
                         fp_toradix_n(&x509->e, exp, 16, j + 1);
                         memset(raw_issuer, 0, CRT_RAWMAXLEN * 2 + 1);
                         memset(raw_subject, 0, CRT_RAWMAXLEN * 2 + 1);
                         memset(raw_serial, 0, CRT_RAWMAXLEN * 2 + 1);
                         for (j = 0; j < x509->raw_issuer[0]; j++)
                             sprintf(&raw_issuer[j * 2], "%02x", x509->raw_issuer[j + 1]);
                         for (j = 0; j < x509->raw_subject[0]; j++)
                             sprintf(&raw_subject[j * 2], "%02x", x509->raw_subject[j + 1]);
                         for (j = 0; j < x509->raw_serial[0]; j++)
                             sprintf(&raw_serial[j * 3], "%02x%c", x509->raw_serial[j + 1], (j != x509->raw_serial[0] - 1) ? ':' : '\0');
                         for (j = 0; j < SHA1_HASH_SIZE; j++) {
                             sprintf(&issuer[j * 2], "%02x", x509->issuer[j]);
                             sprintf(&subject[j * 2], "%02x", x509->subject[j]);
                             sprintf(&serial[j * 2], "%02x", x509->serial[j]);

                         }
 

                         // TODO The raw information we print out here isn't
                         // very helpful, since it's only the first 64-bytes...
                         // Change this so that raw is only populated when the
                         // debug flag is set, and then copy/display the full
                         // contents.

                         cli_dbgmsg("cert:\n");
                         cli_dbgmsg("  subject: %s\n", subject);
                         cli_dbgmsg("  serial: %s\n", serial);
                         cli_dbgmsg("  pubkey: %s\n", mod);
                         cli_dbgmsg("  i: %s %lu->%lu %s%s%s\n", issuer, (unsigned long)x509->not_before, (unsigned long)x509->not_after, x509->codeSign ? "code " : "", x509->timeSign ? "time " : "", x509->certSign ? "cert " : "");
                         cli_dbgmsg("  ==============RAW==============\n");
                         cli_dbgmsg("  raw_subject: %s\n", raw_subject);
                         cli_dbgmsg("  raw_serial: %s\n", raw_serial);
                         cli_dbgmsg("  raw_issuer: %s\n", raw_issuer);

 
                         x509 = x509->next;
                     }
                     x509 = newcerts.crts;
                 }
 

                 /* Determine whether the embedded certificate is blacklisted or
                  * whitelisted. If an embedded cert matches a blacklist rule,
                  * we can return immediately indicating that a sig matched.
                  * This isn't true for whitelist matches, since otherwise an
                  * attacker could just include a known-good certificate in the
                  * signature and not use it. Instead, for those we will add the
                  * embedded cert to the trust store and continue on to ensure
                  * that a trusted cert is used for signing. */
                 while (x509) {
                     cli_crt *crt;
 
                     /* Use &(engine->cmgr) for this check, since we don't copy
                      * blacklist certs into cmgr and so that if there's a
                      * match, we have a long-lived pointer that we can pass

                      * back (via cli_append_virus) indicating the name of the
                      * sigs that matched (we can't just malloc new space for
                      * one, since nothing above here knows to free it.) */

                     if (NULL != (crt = crtmgr_blacklist_lookup(&(engine->cmgr), x509))) {
                         ret = CL_VIRUS;

                         cli_dbgmsg("asn1_parse_mscat: Found Authenticode certificate blacklisted by %s\n", crt->name ? crt->name : "(unnamed CRB rule)");
                         if (NULL != ctx) {
                             ret = cli_append_virus(ctx, crt->name ? crt->name : "(unnamed CRB rule)");
                             if ((ret == CL_VIRUS) && !SCAN_ALLMATCHES) {
                                 crtmgr_free(&newcerts);
                                 goto finish;
                             }

                         }

                         /* In the case where ctx is NULL, we don't care about
                          * blacklist matches - we are either using this
                          * function to parse .cat rules that were loaded in,
                          * or it's sigtool doing cert printing. */

                     }
 
                     /* NOTE: Since the 'issuer' cli_crt field is required for
                      * Authenticode validation, we rely on adding embedded
                      * certs with the 'issuer' actually set into our trust
                      * store for doing the time/code digital signature checks.
                      * This isn't required for cert-signing certs that
                      * we discover this way, since the CRB cli_crts have enough
                      * info to be able to whitelist other certs, but executing
                      * the following code for those has the benefit of removing
                      * them from newcerts so they aren't processed again while
                      * looking for chained trust. */
                     if (NULL != (crt = crtmgr_whitelist_lookup(cmgr, x509, 1))) {
                         cli_crt *tmp = x509->next;
                         cli_dbgmsg("asn1_parse_mscat: Directly whitelisting embedded cert based on %s\n", (crt->name ? crt->name : "(no name)"));

                         if (cli_debug_flag && crt->name) {
                             // Copy the name from the CRB entry for printing below
                             x509->name = strdup(crt->name);
                         }

                         if (crtmgr_add(cmgr, x509)) {
                             cli_dbgmsg("asn1_parse_mscat: adding x509 cert to crtmgr failed\n");
                             break;
                         }
                         crtmgr_del(&newcerts, x509);
                         x509 = tmp;
                         continue;
                     }
 
                     x509 = x509->next;
                 }

                 if (x509) {
                     crtmgr_free(&newcerts);
                     break;
                 }

 
                 /* In the SCAN_ALLMATCHES case, we'd get here with
                  * ret == CL_VIRUS if a match occurred but we wanted
                  * to keep looping to look for other matches.  In that
                  * case, bail here. */
                 if (CL_VIRUS == ret) {
                     crtmgr_free(&newcerts);
                     break;
                 }
 

                 x509 = newcerts.crts;
 
                 /* Now look for cases where embedded certs can be trusted
                  * indirectly because they are signed by trusted certs */

                 while (x509) {

                     cli_crt *parent;
 
                     /* If the certificate is in the trust store already, remove

                      * it from the newcerts list.  This is legacy code that I'm
                      * assuming tries to prevent us from doing the expensive
                      * RSA verification in the case where the same cert is
                      * embedded multiple times?  Sure, why not */
                     if (crtmgr_whitelist_lookup(cmgr, x509, 0)) {

                         cli_crt *tmp = x509->next;
                         cli_dbgmsg("asn1_parse_mscat: found embedded certificate matching one in the trust store\n");
                         crtmgr_del(&newcerts, x509);
                         x509 = tmp;
                         continue;

                     }
 

                     /* Determine whether the cert is signed by one in our trust

                      * store */

                     parent = crtmgr_verify_crt(cmgr, x509);
 

                     if (parent) {

                         cli_dbgmsg("asn1_parse_mscat: Indirectly whitelisting embedded cert based on %s\n", (parent->name ? parent->name : "(no name)"));
 
                         // TODO Why is this done?  It seems like you should be
                         // able to have a parent cert can only do cert signing
                         // and have that be able to sign a cert used for
                         // code-signing...

                         x509->codeSign &= parent->codeSign;
                         x509->timeSign &= parent->timeSign;

                         if (crtmgr_add(cmgr, x509)) {

                             cli_dbgmsg("asn1_parse_mscat: adding x509 cert to crtmgr failed\n");

                             break;

                         }

                         crtmgr_del(&newcerts, x509);

 
                         /* Start at the beginning of newcerts so that we can see
                          * whether adding this new trusted cert causes more
                          * certs to be trusted (via chaining).  Otherwise we
                          * might miss valid certs if the ordering in the binary
                          * doesn't align with the chain ordering. */

                         x509 = newcerts.crts;
                         continue;
                     }

                     x509 = x509->next;
                 }

                 if (x509) {

                     crtmgr_free(&newcerts);
                     break;

                 }

                 if (newcerts.items)

                     cli_dbgmsg("asn1_parse_mscat: %u certificates did not verify\n", newcerts.items);
                 crtmgr_free(&newcerts);
             }
         }
 

         // Parse the final section in SignedData - SignerInfos

         if (asn1_get_obj(map, asn1.next, &size, &asn1)) {

             cli_dbgmsg("asn1_parse_mscat: failed to get next ASN1 section\n");

             break;

         }

         if (asn1.type == 0xa1 && asn1_get_obj(map, asn1.next, &size, &asn1)) { /* crls - unused shouldn't be present */

             cli_dbgmsg("asn1_parse_mscat: unexpected CRL entries were found\n");

             break;

         }

         if (asn1.type != ASN1_TYPE_SET) { /* signerInfos */

             cli_dbgmsg("asn1_parse_mscat: unexpected type %02x for signerInfo\n", asn1.type);

             break;
         }

         if (size) {

             cli_dbgmsg("asn1_parse_mscat: unexpected extra data after signerInfos\n");
             break;
         }
         size = asn1.size;

         if (asn1_expect_objtype(map, asn1.content, &size, &asn1, ASN1_TYPE_SEQUENCE)) {

             cli_dbgmsg("asn1_parse_mscat: expected SEQUENCE in signerInfos");

             break;

         }

         if (size) {

             cli_dbgmsg("asn1_parse_mscat: only one signerInfo shall be present\n");
             break;
         }
         size = asn1.size;

         if (asn1_expect_obj(map, &asn1.content, &size, ASN1_TYPE_INTEGER, 1, "\x01")) { /* Version = 1 */

             cli_dbgmsg("asn1_parse_mscat: expected Version == 1 for signerInfo\n");

             break;

         }

         if (asn1_expect_objtype(map, asn1.content, &size, &asn1, ASN1_TYPE_SEQUENCE)) { /* issuerAndSerialNumber */

             cli_dbgmsg("asn1_parse_mscat: expected issuerAndSerialNumber SEQUENCE\n");

             break;

         }

         // asn1.next and size must be preserved so we can continue parsing
         // SignerInfos, so switch to deep

         dsize = asn1.size;

         if (asn1_expect_objtype(map, asn1.content, &dsize, &deep, ASN1_TYPE_SEQUENCE)) { /* issuer */

             cli_dbgmsg("asn1_parse_mscat: expected issuer SEQUENCE\n");

             break;

         }
 
         /* Make sure the issuer ID is mapped into memory and then compute the
          * SHA1 of it so we can use this value in verification later on. This
          * will be a hash over all the values in the issuer SEQUENCE, which
          * looks something like:
          * SET(1 elem)
          *     SEQUENCE(2 elem)
          *         OBJECT IDENTIFIER 2.5.4.6 countryName (X.520 DN component)
          *         PrintableString
          * SET(1 elem)
          *     SEQUENCE(2 elem)
          *         OBJECT IDENTIFIER2.5.4.8 stateOrProvinceName (X.520 DN component)
          *         PrintableString
          * SET(1 elem)
          *     SEQUENCE(2 elem)
          *         OBJECT IDENTIFIER2.5.4.7 localityName (X.520 DN component)
          *         PrintableString
          * SET(1 elem)
          *     SEQUENCE(2 elem)
          *         OBJECT IDENTIFIER2.5.4.10 organizationName (X.520 DN component)
          *         PrintableString
          * SET(1 elem)
          *     SEQUENCE(2 elem)
          *         OBJECT IDENTIFIER2.5.4.3commonName(X.520 DN component)
          *         PrintableString
          */

         if (map_sha1(map, deep.content, deep.size, issuer)) {

             cli_dbgmsg("asn1_parse_mscat: error in call to map_sha1 for issuer\n");

             break;

         }

         if (asn1_expect_objtype(map, deep.next, &dsize, &deep, ASN1_TYPE_INTEGER)) { /* serial */

             cli_dbgmsg("asn1_parse_mscat: expected ASN1_TYPE_INTEGER serial\n");

             break;

         }
 
         /* Make sure the serial INTEGER is mapped into memory and compute the
          * SHA1 of it so we can use this value in verification later on. */

         if (map_sha1(map, deep.content, deep.size, serial)) {

             cli_dbgmsg("asn1_parse_mscat: error in call to map_sha1 for serial\n");

             break;

         }

         if (dsize) {

             cli_dbgmsg("asn1_parse_mscat: extra data inside issuerAndSerialNumber\n");
             break;
         }

 
         // Resume parsing the SignerInfos using asn1.next and size

         if (asn1_expect_hash_algo(map, &asn1.next, &size, &hashtype2, &hashsize)) {
             cli_dbgmsg("asn1_parse_mscat: error parsing SignerInfo digestAlgorithm\n");

             break;
         }
 
         // Verify that the SignerInfo digestAlgorithm matches the one from the SignedData section

         if (hashtype != hashtype2) {

             cli_dbgmsg("asn1_parse_mscat: SignerInfo digestAlgorithm is not the same as the algorithm in SignedData\n");
             break;

         }

         // Continue on to the authenticatedAttributes section within SignerInfo

         attrs = asn1.next;

         if (asn1_expect_objtype(map, asn1.next, &size, &asn1, 0xa0)) { /* authenticatedAttributes */

             cli_dbgmsg("asn1_parse_mscat: unable to parse authenticatedAttributes section\n");

             break;

         }

         attrs_size = (uint8_t *)(asn1.next) - attrs;

         if (asn1.next == NULL || attrs_size < 2) {

             cli_dbgmsg("asn1_parse_mscat: authenticatedAttributes size is too small\n");
             break;
         }
 

         dsize     = asn1.size;

         deep.next = asn1.content;

         result    = 0;
         while (dsize) {

             struct cli_asn1 cobj;
             int content;

             if (asn1_expect_objtype(map, deep.next, &dsize, &deep, ASN1_TYPE_SEQUENCE)) { /* attribute */

                 cli_dbgmsg("asn1_parse_mscat: expected attribute SEQUENCE\n");

                 dsize = 1;
                 break;
             }

             if (asn1_expect_objtype(map, deep.content, &deep.size, &deeper, ASN1_TYPE_OBJECT_ID)) { /* attribute type */

                 cli_dbgmsg("asn1_parse_mscat: expected attribute type inside attribute SEQUENCE\n");

                 dsize = 1;
                 break;
             }

             if (deeper.size != lenof(OID_contentType))

                 continue;

             if (!fmap_need_ptr_once(map, deeper.content, lenof(OID_contentType))) {

                 cli_dbgmsg("asn1_parse_mscat: failed to read authenticated attribute\n");
                 dsize = 1;
                 break;
             }

             if (!memcmp(deeper.content, OID_contentType, lenof(OID_contentType)))

                 content = 0; /* contentType */

             else if (!memcmp(deeper.content, OID_messageDigest, lenof(OID_messageDigest)))

                 content = 1; /* messageDigest */
             else
                 continue;

             if (asn1_expect_objtype(map, deeper.next, &deep.size, &deeper, ASN1_TYPE_SET)) { /* set - contents */

                 cli_dbgmsg("asn1_parse_mscat: expected 'set - contents' for authenticated attribute\n");

                 dsize = 1;
                 break;
             }

             if (deep.size) {

                 cli_dbgmsg("asn1_parse_mscat: extra data in authenticated attributes\n");
                 dsize = 1;
                 break;

             }

             if (result & (1 << content)) {

                 cli_dbgmsg("asn1_parse_mscat: contentType or messageDigest appear twice\n");
                 dsize = 1;
                 break;
             }

             if (content == 0) { /* contentType */
                 if (
                     (!embedded && asn1_expect_obj(map, &deeper.content, &deeper.size, ASN1_TYPE_OBJECT_ID, lenof(OID_szOID_CTL), OID_szOID_CTL)) ||                         /* cat file */
                     (embedded && asn1_expect_obj(map, &deeper.content, &deeper.size, ASN1_TYPE_OBJECT_ID, lenof(OID_SPC_INDIRECT_DATA_OBJID), OID_SPC_INDIRECT_DATA_OBJID)) /* embedded cat */
                 ) {

                     cli_dbgmsg("asn1_parse_mscat: unexpected ContentType for embedded mode %d (for authenticated attribute)\n", embedded);

                     dsize = 1;
                     break;
                 }
                 result |= 1;
             } else { /* messageDigest */

                 if (asn1_expect_objtype(map, deeper.content, &deeper.size, &cobj, ASN1_TYPE_OCTET_STRING)) {

                     cli_dbgmsg("asn1_parse_mscat: unexpected messageDigest value\n");

                     dsize = 1;
                     break;
                 }

                 if (cobj.size != hashsize) {

                     cli_dbgmsg("asn1_parse_mscat: messageDigest attribute has the wrong size (%u)\n", cobj.size);

                     dsize = 1;
                     break;
                 }

                 if (!fmap_need_ptr_once(map, cobj.content, hashsize)) {

                     cli_dbgmsg("asn1_parse_mscat: failed to read authenticated attribute\n");
                     dsize = 1;
                     break;
                 }

                 memcpy(md, cobj.content, hashsize);

                 result |= 2;
             }

             if (deeper.size) {

                 cli_dbgmsg("asn1_parse_mscat: extra data in authenticated attribute\n");
                 dsize = 1;

                 break;

             }
         }

         if (dsize)

             break;

         if (result != 3) {

             cli_dbgmsg("asn1_parse_mscat: contentType or messageDigest are missing\n");
             break;
         }
 

         if (asn1_expect_algo(map, &asn1.next, &size, lenof(OID_rsaEncryption), OID_rsaEncryption)) { /* digestEncryptionAlgorithm == rsa */

             cli_dbgmsg("asn1_parse_mscat: digestEncryptionAlgorithms other than RSA are not yet supported\n");

             break;

         }

         if (asn1_expect_objtype(map, asn1.next, &size, &asn1, ASN1_TYPE_OCTET_STRING)) { /* encryptedDigest */

             cli_dbgmsg("asn1_parse_mscat: unexpected encryptedDigest value\n");

             break;

         }
 

         // TODO Make this a #define with the greatest possible length (SHA512)

         if (asn1.size > 513) {

             cli_dbgmsg("asn1_parse_mscat: encryptedDigest too long\n");
             break;

         }

         if (map_hash(map, *hashes, *hashes_size, hash, hashtype)) {

             cli_dbgmsg("asn1_parse_mscat: failed to map in message/compute message digest\n");

             break;

         }

         if (memcmp(hash, md, hashsize)) {

             cli_dbgmsg("asn1_parse_mscat: messageDigest mismatch\n");
             break;
         }
 

         if (!fmap_need_ptr_once(map, attrs, attrs_size)) {

             cli_dbgmsg("asn1_parse_mscat: failed to read authenticatedAttributes\n");
             break;
         }
 

         if (NULL == (hash_ctx = get_hash_ctx(hashtype))) {

             break;
         }
 

         cl_update_hash(hash_ctx, "\x31", 1);
         cl_update_hash(hash_ctx, (void *)(attrs + 1), attrs_size - 1);
         cl_finish_hash(hash_ctx, hash);

         if (!fmap_need_ptr_once(map, asn1.content, asn1.size)) {

             cli_dbgmsg("asn1_parse_mscat: failed to read encryptedDigest\n");
             break;
         }

 
         // Verify the authenticatedAttributes

         if (!(x509 = crtmgr_verify_pkcs7(cmgr, issuer, serial, asn1.content, asn1.size, hashtype, hash, VRFY_CODE))) {

             cli_dbgmsg("asn1_parse_mscat: pkcs7 signature verification failed\n");

             ret = CL_EVERIFY;

             break;

         }

         message      = asn1.content;

         message_size = asn1.size;

         cli_dbgmsg("asn1_parse_mscat: authenticatedAttributes successfully parsed and verified\n");
 
         /* We need to verify the time validity of the certificate.  If a
          * signature has a time-stamping countersignature, then we just need to
          * verify that countersignature.  Otherwise, we should determine
          * whether the signing certificate is still valid (time-based, since at
          * this point in the code no matching blacklist rules fired). */
 

         if (!size) {

             time_t now;
 
             // No countersignature, so judge validity based on time
             now = time(NULL);
 

             if (now < x509->not_before || now > x509->not_after) {

                 cli_dbgmsg("asn1_parse_mscat: no countersignature (unauthAttrs missing) and signing certificate has expired\n");

                 ret = CL_EVERIFY;

                 break;
             }
 

             cli_dbgmsg("asn1_parse_mscat: no countersignature (unauthAttrs missing) but the signing certificate is still valid\n");

             ret = CL_CLEAN;

             goto finish;

         }
 

         if (size && asn1_expect_objtype(map, asn1.next, &size, &asn1, 0xa1)) { /* unauthenticatedAttributes */

             cli_dbgmsg("asn1_parse_mscat: unable to find unauthenticatedAttributes section\n");

             break;

         }

         if (size) {

             cli_dbgmsg("asn1_parse_mscat: extra data inside signerInfo\n");
             break;
         }
 

         // Parse the unauthenticated attributes

         dsize     = asn1.size;

         deep.next = asn1.content;

         result    = 0;
         while (dsize) {

             int content;

             if (asn1_expect_objtype(map, deep.next, &dsize, &deep, ASN1_TYPE_SEQUENCE)) {

                 cli_dbgmsg("asn1_parse_mscat: expected SEQUENCE starting an unauthenticatedAttribute\n");

                 dsize = 1;
                 break;
             }

             if (asn1_expect_objtype(map, deep.content, &deep.size, &deeper, ASN1_TYPE_OBJECT_ID)) {

                 cli_dbgmsg("asn1_parse_mscat: expected OID inside unauthenticatedAttribute SEQUENCE\n");

                 dsize = 1;
                 break;
             }

             // Supported OIDs include:
             // - 1.2.840.113549.1.9.6 - counterSignature
             // - 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.2.4.1 - nested signatures
 
             // I've seen some other ones like 1.3.6.1.4.1.3845.3.9876.1.1.1,
             // and the presence of those doesn't seem to mess up verification
             // through the Windows API, so just skip those
 

             if (deeper.size != lenof(OID_countersignature) && deeper.size != lenof(OID_nestedSignatures)) {

                 continue;

             }

             if (!fmap_need_ptr_once(map, deeper.content, deeper.size)) {

                 cli_dbgmsg("asn1_parse_mscat: failed to read unauthenticated attribute OID\n");

                 dsize = 1;
                 break;
             }

             if (!memcmp(deeper.content, OID_countersignature, deeper.size))

                 content = 0; /* counterSignature */

             else if (!memcmp(deeper.content, OID_nestedSignatures, deeper.size))

                 content = 1; /* nested */
             else {

                 continue;
             }

             if (asn1_expect_objtype(map, deeper.next, &deep.size, &deeper, ASN1_TYPE_SET)) { /* set - contents */

                 cli_dbgmsg("asn1_parse_mscat: expected 'set - contents' inside unauthenticated attribute\n");

                 dsize = 1;
                 break;
             }

             if (deep.size) {

                 cli_dbgmsg("asn1_parse_mscat: extra data in unauthenticated attribute\n");

                 dsize = 1;
                 break;
             }

             if (result & (1 << content)) {

                 cli_dbgmsg("asn1_parse_mscat: counterSignature or nestedSignature appear twice\n");

                 dsize = 1;
                 break;
             }
 

             if (content == 0) { /* counterSignature */

                 if (asn1_parse_countersignature(map, &deeper.content, &deeper.size, cmgr, message, message_size, x509->not_before, x509->not_after)) {

                     dsize = 1;
                     break;
                 }

                 result |= 1;

             } else { /* nestedSignature */

                 // TODO Support parsing these out in the future
                 cli_dbgmsg("asn1_parse_mscat: nested signatures detected but parsing them is not currently supported\n");

                 deeper.size = 0;
                 result |= 2;
             }

             if (deeper.size) {

                 cli_dbgmsg("asn1_parse_mscat: extra data in unauthenticated attribute\n");
                 dsize = 1;
                 break;
             }

         }

         if (dsize)

             break;

         cli_dbgmsg("asn1_parse_mscat: unauthenticatedAttributes successfully parsed\n");
 

         if (1 != (result & 1)) {

             time_t now;

             // No countersignature, so judge validity based on time
             now = time(NULL);

             if (now < x509->not_before || now > x509->not_after) {

                 cli_dbgmsg("asn1_parse_mscat: no countersignature and signing certificate has expired\n");

                 ret = CL_EVERIFY;

                 break;
             }
 

             cli_dbgmsg("asn1_parse_mscat: no countersignature but the signing certificate is still valid\n");

         }
 

         ret = CL_CLEAN;

     } while (0);

 finish:
     if (CL_EPARSE == ret) {
         cli_dbgmsg("asn1_parse_mscat: failed to parse authenticode section\n");
     }
     return ret;

 }

 int asn1_load_mscat(fmap_t *map, struct cl_engine *engine)
 {

     struct cli_asn1 c;

     unsigned int size;

     int i;

     // TODO As currently implemented, loading in a .cat file with -d requires
     // an accompanying .crb with whitelist entries that will cause the .cat
     // file signatures to verify successfully.  If a user is specifying a .cat
     // file to use, though, we should assume they trust it and at least add the
     // covered hashes from it to hm_fp
     // TODO Since we pass engine->cmgr directly here, the whole chain of trust
     // for this .cat file will get added to the global trust store assuming it
     // verifies successfully.  Is this a bug for a feature?

     if (CL_CLEAN != asn1_parse_mscat(engine, map, 0, map->len, &engine->cmgr, 0, &c.next, &size, NULL))

         return 1;

     if (asn1_expect_objtype(map, c.next, &size, &c, ASN1_TYPE_SEQUENCE))

         return 1;

     if (asn1_expect_obj(map, &c.content, &c.size, ASN1_TYPE_OBJECT_ID, lenof(OID_szOID_CATALOG_LIST), OID_szOID_CATALOG_LIST))

         return 1;

     if (c.size) {

         cli_dbgmsg("asn1_load_mscat: found extra data in szOID_CATALOG_LIST content\n");
         return 1;

     }

     if (asn1_expect_objtype(map, c.next, &size, &c, 0x4)) /* List ID */

         return 1;

     if (asn1_expect_objtype(map, c.next, &size, &c, 0x17)) /* Effective date - WTF?! */

         return 1;

     if (asn1_expect_algo(map, &c.next, &size, lenof(OID_szOID_CATALOG_LIST_MEMBER), OID_szOID_CATALOG_LIST_MEMBER)) /* szOID_CATALOG_LIST_MEMBER */

         return 1;

     if (asn1_expect_objtype(map, c.next, &size, &c, ASN1_TYPE_SEQUENCE)) /* hashes here */

         return 1;

     /* [0] is next but we don't care as it's really descriptives stuff */
 

     size   = c.size;

     c.next = c.content;

     while (size) {

         struct cli_asn1 tag;

         if (asn1_expect_objtype(map, c.next, &size, &c, ASN1_TYPE_SEQUENCE))

             return 1;

         if (asn1_expect_objtype(map, c.content, &c.size, &tag, ASN1_TYPE_OCTET_STRING)) /* TAG NAME */

             return 1;

         if (asn1_expect_objtype(map, tag.next, &c.size, &tag, ASN1_TYPE_SET)) /* set */

             return 1;

         if (c.size) {

             cli_dbgmsg("asn1_load_mscat: found extra data in tag\n");
             return 1;
         }

         while (tag.size) {

             struct cli_asn1 tagval1, tagval2, tagval3;
             int hashtype;
 

             if (asn1_expect_objtype(map, tag.content, &tag.size, &tagval1, ASN1_TYPE_SEQUENCE))

                 return 1;
             tag.content = tagval1.next;
 

             if (asn1_expect_objtype(map, tagval1.content, &tagval1.size, &tagval2, ASN1_TYPE_OBJECT_ID))

                 return 1;

             if (tagval2.size != lenof(OID_SPC_INDIRECT_DATA_OBJID))

                 continue;
 

             if (!fmap_need_ptr_once(map, tagval2.content, lenof(OID_SPC_INDIRECT_DATA_OBJID))) {

                 cli_dbgmsg("asn1_load_mscat: cannot read SPC_INDIRECT_DATA\n");
                 return 1;
             }

             if (memcmp(tagval2.content, OID_SPC_INDIRECT_DATA_OBJID, lenof(OID_SPC_INDIRECT_DATA_OBJID)))

                 continue; /* stuff like CAT_NAMEVALUE_OBJID(1.3.6.1.4.1.311.12.2.1) and CAT_MEMBERINFO_OBJID(.2).. */
 

             if (asn1_expect_objtype(map, tagval2.next, &tagval1.size, &tagval2, ASN1_TYPE_SET))

                 return 1;

             if (tagval1.size) {

                 cli_dbgmsg("asn1_load_mscat: found extra data in tag value\n");
                 return 1;
             }
 

             if (asn1_expect_objtype(map, tagval2.content, &tagval2.size, &tagval1, ASN1_TYPE_SEQUENCE))

                 return 1;

             if (tagval2.size) {

                 cli_dbgmsg("asn1_load_mscat: found extra data in SPC_INDIRECT_DATA_OBJID tag\n");
                 return 1;
             }
 

             if (asn1_expect_objtype(map, tagval1.content, &tagval1.size, &tagval2, ASN1_TYPE_SEQUENCE))

                 return 1;
 

             if (asn1_expect_objtype(map, tagval2.content, &tagval2.size, &tagval3, ASN1_TYPE_OBJECT_ID)) /* shall have an obj 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.2.1.15 or 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.2.1.25 inside */

                 return 1;

             if (tagval3.size != lenof(OID_SPC_PE_IMAGE_DATA_OBJID)) { /* lenof(OID_SPC_PE_IMAGE_DATA_OBJID) = lenof(OID_SPC_CAB_DATA_OBJID) = 10*/

                 cli_dbgmsg("asn1_load_mscat: bad hash type size\n");
                 return 1;
             }

             if (!fmap_need_ptr_once(map, tagval3.content, lenof(OID_SPC_PE_IMAGE_DATA_OBJID))) {

                 cli_dbgmsg("asn1_load_mscat: cannot read hash type\n");
                 return 1;
             }

             if (!memcmp(tagval3.content, OID_SPC_PE_IMAGE_DATA_OBJID, lenof(OID_SPC_PE_IMAGE_DATA_OBJID)))

                 hashtype = 2;

             else if (!memcmp(tagval3.content, OID_SPC_CAB_DATA_OBJID, lenof(OID_SPC_CAB_DATA_OBJID)))

                 hashtype = 1;
             else {
                 cli_dbgmsg("asn1_load_mscat: unexpected hash type\n");
                 return 1;
             }
 

             if (asn1_expect_objtype(map, tagval2.next, &tagval1.size, &tagval2, ASN1_TYPE_SEQUENCE))

                 return 1;

             if (tagval1.size) {

                 cli_dbgmsg("asn1_load_mscat: found extra data after hash\n");
                 return 1;
             }
 

             if (asn1_expect_algo(map, &tagval2.content, &tagval2.size, lenof(OID_sha1), OID_sha1)) { /* objid 1.3.14.3.2.26 - sha1 */

                 cli_dbgmsg("asn1_load_mscat: currently only SHA1 hashes are supported for .cat file signatures\n");

                 return 1;

             }

             if (asn1_expect_objtype(map, tagval2.content, &tagval2.size, &tagval3, ASN1_TYPE_OCTET_STRING))

                 return 1;

             if (tagval2.size) {

                 cli_dbgmsg("asn1_load_mscat: found extra data in hash\n");
                 return 1;
             }

             if (tagval3.size != SHA1_HASH_SIZE) {

                 cli_dbgmsg("asn1_load_mscat: bad hash size %u\n", tagval3.size);
                 return 1;
             }

             if (!fmap_need_ptr_once(map, tagval3.content, SHA1_HASH_SIZE)) {

                 cli_dbgmsg("asn1_load_mscat: cannot read hash\n");
                 return 1;
             }
 

             if (cli_debug_flag) {
                 char sha1[SHA1_HASH_SIZE * 2 + 1];
                 for (i = 0; i < SHA1_HASH_SIZE; i++)
                     sprintf(&sha1[i * 2], "%02x", ((uint8_t *)(tagval3.content))[i]);

                 cli_dbgmsg("asn1_load_mscat: got hash %s (%s)\n", sha1, (hashtype == 2) ? "PE" : "CAB");
             }

             if (!engine->hm_fp) {

                 if (!(engine->hm_fp = MPOOL_CALLOC(engine->mempool, 1, sizeof(*(engine->hm_fp))))) {

                     tag.size = 1;

                     return 1;
                 }

 #ifdef USE_MPOOL

                 engine->hm_fp->mempool = engine->mempool;

 #endif

             }

             /* Load the trusted hashes into hm_fp, using the size values
              * 1 and 2 as sentinel values corresponding to CAB and PE hashes
              * from .cat files respectively. */

             if (hm_addhash_bin(engine->hm_fp, tagval3.content, CLI_HASH_SHA1, hashtype, NULL)) {

                 cli_warnmsg("asn1_load_mscat: failed to add hash\n");
                 return 1;
             }
         }

     }

     return 0;
 }
 

 /* Check an embedded PE Authenticode section to determine whether it's trusted.

  * This will return CL_VERIFIED if the file should be trusted, CL_EPARSE if an

  * error occurred while parsing the signature, CL_EVERIFY if parsing was
  * successful but there were no whitelist rules for the signature, and

  * CL_VIRUS if a blacklist rule was found for an embedded certificate.
  *
  * If CL_VIRUS is returned, certname will be set to the certname of blacklist
  * rule that matched (unless certname is NULL). */

 cl_error_t asn1_check_mscat(struct cl_engine *engine, fmap_t *map, size_t offset, unsigned int size, struct cli_mapped_region *regions, uint32_t nregions, cli_ctx *ctx)

 {

     unsigned int content_size;
     struct cli_asn1 c;

     cli_crt_hashtype hashtype;
     uint8_t hash[MAX_HASH_SIZE];
     unsigned int hashsize;

     const void *content;

     crtmgr certs;
     int ret;

     void *hash_ctx;

     unsigned int i;

     cli_dbgmsg("in asn1_check_mscat (offset: %llu)\n", (long long unsigned)offset);

     crtmgr_init(&certs);

     /* Get a copy of all certs in the trust store, excluding blacklist certs */
     if (crtmgr_add_roots(engine, &certs, 1)) {

         crtmgr_free(&certs);

         return CL_EVERIFY;

     }

     ret = asn1_parse_mscat(engine, map, offset, size, &certs, 1, &content, &content_size, ctx);

     crtmgr_free(&certs);

     if (CL_CLEAN != ret)

         return ret;

     if (asn1_expect_objtype(map, content, &content_size, &c, ASN1_TYPE_SEQUENCE)) {

         cli_dbgmsg("asn1_check_mscat: expected SEQUENCE at top level of hash container\n");

         return CL_EPARSE;

     }

     if (asn1_expect_obj(map, &c.content, &c.size, ASN1_TYPE_OBJECT_ID, lenof(OID_SPC_PE_IMAGE_DATA_OBJID), OID_SPC_PE_IMAGE_DATA_OBJID)) {

         cli_dbgmsg("asn1_check_mscat: expected spcPEImageData OID in the first hash SEQUENCE\n");

         return CL_EPARSE;

     }
 
     // TODO Should we do anything with the underlying SEQUENCE and data?  From
     // the 2008 spec doc it doesn't sound like many of the fields are used, so
     // ignoring is probably fine for now
 

     if (asn1_expect_objtype(map, c.next, &content_size, &c, ASN1_TYPE_SEQUENCE)) {

         cli_dbgmsg("asn1_check_mscat: expected second hash container object to be a SEQUENCE\n");

         return CL_EPARSE;

     }

     if (content_size) {

         cli_dbgmsg("asn1_check_mscat: extra data in hash SEQUENCE\n");

         return CL_EPARSE;

     }

     if (asn1_expect_hash_algo(map, &c.content, &c.size, &hashtype, &hashsize)) {

         cli_dbgmsg("asn1_check_mscat: unexpected file hash algo\n");

         return CL_EPARSE;

     }
 

     if (NULL == (hash_ctx = get_hash_ctx(hashtype))) {

         return CL_EPARSE;

     }

     // Now that we know the hash algorithm, compute the authenticode hash
     // across the required regions of memory.

     for (i = 0; i < nregions; i++) {

         const uint8_t *hptr;
         if (0 == regions[i].size) {
             continue;
         }

         if (!(hptr = fmap_need_off_once(map, regions[i].offset, regions[i].size))) {

             return CL_EVERIFY;

         }
 

         cl_update_hash(hash_ctx, hptr, regions[i].size);

     }
 

     cl_finish_hash(hash_ctx, hash);

     if (cli_debug_flag) {
         char hashtxt[MAX_HASH_SIZE * 2 + 1];
         for (i = 0; i < hashsize; i++)
             sprintf(&hashtxt[i * 2], "%02x", hash[i]);

         cli_dbgmsg("Authenticode: %s\n", hashtxt);
     }
 

     if (asn1_expect_obj(map, &c.content, &c.size, ASN1_TYPE_OCTET_STRING, hashsize, hash)) {

         cli_dbgmsg("asn1_check_mscat: computed authenticode hash did not match stored value\n");

         return CL_EVERIFY;

     }

     if (c.size) {

         cli_dbgmsg("asn1_check_mscat: extra data after the stored authenticode hash\n");

         return CL_EPARSE;

     }

     cli_dbgmsg("asn1_check_mscat: file with valid authenticode signature, whitelisted\n");

     return CL_VERIFIED;

 }