/*
 *  Copyright (C) 2013-2019 Cisco Systems, Inc. and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
 *  Copyright (C) 2011-2013 Sourcefire, Inc.
 *
 *  Authors: aCaB
 *
 *  This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
 *  it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as
 *  published by the Free Software Foundation.
 *
 *  This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
 *  but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
 *  MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
 *  GNU General Public License for more details.
 *
 *  You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
 *  along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
 *  Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston,
 *  MA 02110-1301, USA.
 */

#if HAVE_CONFIG_H
#include "clamav-config.h"
#endif

#include "clamav.h"
#include "others.h"
#include "crtmgr.h"

#define OID_1_2_840_113549_2_5 "\x2a\x86\x48\x86\xf7\x0d\x02\x05"
#define OID_md5 OID_1_2_840_113549_2_5

#define OID_1_3_14_3_2_26 "\x2b\x0e\x03\x02\x1a"
#define OID_sha1 OID_1_3_14_3_2_26

#define OID_2_16_840_1_101_3_4_2_1 "\x60\x86\x48\x01\x65\x03\x04\x02\x01"
#define OID_sha256 OID_2_16_840_1_101_3_4_2_1

#define OID_2_16_840_1_101_3_4_2_2 "\x60\x86\x48\x01\x65\x03\x04\x02\x02"
#define OID_sha384 OID_2_16_840_1_101_3_4_2_2

#define OID_2_16_840_1_101_3_4_2_3 "\x60\x86\x48\x01\x65\x03\x04\x02\x03"
#define OID_sha512 OID_2_16_840_1_101_3_4_2_3

int cli_crt_init(cli_crt *x509)
{
    int ret;

    memset(x509, 0, sizeof(*x509));

    if ((ret = mp_init_multi(&x509->n, &x509->e, &x509->sig, NULL))) {
        cli_errmsg("cli_crt_init: mp_init_multi failed with %d\n", ret);
        return 1;
    }
    return 0;
}

void cli_crt_clear(cli_crt *x509)
{
    UNUSEDPARAM(x509);
    mp_clear_multi(&x509->n, &x509->e, &x509->sig, NULL);
}

/* Look for an existing certificate in the trust store m.  This search allows
 * the not_before / not_after / certSign / codeSign / timeSign fields to be
 * more restrictive than the values associated with a cert in the trust store,
 * but not less.  It's probably overkill to not do exact matching on those
 * fields... TODO Is there a case where this is needed
 *
 * There are two ways that things get added to the whitelist - through the CRB
 * rules, and through embedded signatures / catalog files that we parse.  CRB
 * rules don't currently allow the issuer and hashtype to be specified, so the
 * code sets those to sentinel values (0xcacacaca repeating and
 * CLI_HASHTYPE_ANY respectively).  There are two ways we'd like to use this
 * function:
 * 
 *  - To see whether x509 already exists in m (when adding new CRB sig certs
 *    and when adding certs that are embedded in Authenticode signatures) to
 *    prevent duplicate entries. In this case, we want to take x509's
 *    hashtype and issuer field into account, so a CRB sig cert entry isn't
 *    returned for an embedded cert duplicate check, and so that two embedded
 *    certs with different hash types or issuers aren't treated as being the
 *    same.
 * 
 *  - To see whether a CRB sig matches against x509, deeming it worthy to be
 *    added to the trust store.  In this case, we don't want to compare
 *    hashtype and issuer, since the embedded sig will have the actual values
 *    and the CRB sig cert will have placeholder values.
 * 
 * Use crb_crts_only to distinguish between the two cases.  If True, it will
 * ignore all crts not added from CRB rules and ignore x509's issuer and
 * hashtype fields */
cli_crt *crtmgr_whitelist_lookup(crtmgr *m, cli_crt *x509, int crb_crts_only)
{
    cli_crt *i;
    for (i = m->crts; i; i = i->next) {

        if (i->isBlacklisted) {
            continue;
        }

        if (crb_crts_only) {
            if (i->hashtype != CLI_HASHTYPE_ANY) {
                continue;
            }
        } else {
            /* Almost all of the rules in m will be CRB rules, so optimize for
             * the case where we are trying to determine whether an embedded
             * cert already exists in m (by checking the hashtype first). Do
             * the issuer check here too to simplify the code. */

            if (x509->hashtype != i->hashtype ||
                memcmp(x509->issuer, i->issuer, sizeof(i->issuer))) {
                continue;
            }
        }

        if (x509->not_before >= i->not_before &&
            x509->not_after <= i->not_after &&
            (i->certSign | x509->certSign) == i->certSign &&
            (i->codeSign | x509->codeSign) == i->codeSign &&
            (i->timeSign | x509->timeSign) == i->timeSign &&
            !memcmp(x509->subject, i->subject, sizeof(i->subject)) &&
            !memcmp(x509->serial, i->serial, sizeof(i->serial)) &&
            !mp_cmp(&x509->n, &i->n) &&
            !mp_cmp(&x509->e, &i->e)) {
            return i;
        }
    }
    return NULL;
}

cli_crt *crtmgr_blacklist_lookup(crtmgr *m, cli_crt *x509)
{
    cli_crt *i;
    for (i = m->crts; i; i = i->next) {
        // The CRB rules are based on subject, serial, and public key,
        // so do blacklist queries based on those fields

        // TODO the rule format specifies CodeSign / TimeSign / CertSign
        // which we could also match on, but we just ignore those fields
        // for blacklist certs for now

        // TODO Handle the case where these items aren't specified in a CRB
        // rule entry - substitute in default values instead (or make the
        // crb parser not permit leaving these fields blank).

        if (i->isBlacklisted &&
            !memcmp(i->subject, x509->subject, sizeof(i->subject)) &&
            !memcmp(i->serial, x509->serial, sizeof(i->serial)) &&
            !mp_cmp(&x509->n, &i->n) &&
            !mp_cmp(&x509->e, &i->e)) {
            return i;
        }
    }
    return NULL;
}

/* Determine whether x509 already exists in m. The fields compared depend on
 * whether x509 is a blacklist entry or a trusted certificate */
cli_crt *crtmgr_lookup(crtmgr *m, cli_crt *x509)
{
    if (x509->isBlacklisted) {
        return crtmgr_blacklist_lookup(m, x509);
    } else {
        return crtmgr_whitelist_lookup(m, x509, 0);
    }
}

int crtmgr_add(crtmgr *m, cli_crt *x509)
{
    cli_crt *i;
    int ret = 0;

    if (x509->isBlacklisted) {
        if (crtmgr_blacklist_lookup(m, x509)) {
            cli_dbgmsg("crtmgr_add: duplicate blacklist entry detected - not adding\n");
            return 0;
        }
    } else {
        if (crtmgr_whitelist_lookup(m, x509, 0)) {
            cli_dbgmsg("crtmgr_add: duplicate trusted certificate detected - not adding\n");
            return 0;
        }
    }

    i = cli_malloc(sizeof(*i));
    if (!i)
        return 1;

    if ((ret = mp_init_multi(&i->n, &i->e, &i->sig, NULL))) {
        cli_warnmsg("crtmgr_add: failed to mp_init failed with %d\n", ret);
        free(i);
        return 1;
    }
    if ((ret = mp_copy(&x509->n, &i->n)) || (ret = mp_copy(&x509->e, &i->e)) || (ret = mp_copy(&x509->sig, &i->sig))) {
        cli_warnmsg("crtmgr_add: failed to mp_init failed with %d\n", ret);
        cli_crt_clear(i);
        free(i);
        return 1;
    }

    if ((x509->name))
        i->name = strdup(x509->name);
    else
        i->name = NULL;

    memcpy(i->raw_subject, x509->raw_subject, sizeof(i->raw_subject));
    memcpy(i->raw_issuer, x509->raw_issuer, sizeof(i->raw_issuer));
    memcpy(i->raw_serial, x509->raw_serial, sizeof(i->raw_serial));
    memcpy(i->subject, x509->subject, sizeof(i->subject));
    memcpy(i->serial, x509->serial, sizeof(i->serial));
    memcpy(i->issuer, x509->issuer, sizeof(i->issuer));
    memcpy(i->tbshash, x509->tbshash, sizeof(i->tbshash));
    i->not_before    = x509->not_before;
    i->not_after     = x509->not_after;
    i->hashtype      = x509->hashtype;
    i->certSign      = x509->certSign;
    i->codeSign      = x509->codeSign;
    i->timeSign      = x509->timeSign;
    i->isBlacklisted = x509->isBlacklisted;
    i->next          = m->crts;
    i->prev          = NULL;
    if (m->crts)
        m->crts->prev = i;
    m->crts = i;

    m->items++;
    return 0;
}

void crtmgr_init(crtmgr *m)
{
    m->crts  = NULL;
    m->items = 0;
}

void crtmgr_del(crtmgr *m, cli_crt *x509)
{
    cli_crt *i;
    for (i = m->crts; i; i = i->next) {
        if (i == x509) {
            if (i->prev)
                i->prev->next = i->next;
            else
                m->crts = i->next;
            if (i->next)
                i->next->prev = i->prev;
            cli_crt_clear(x509);
            if ((x509->name))
                free(x509->name);
            free(x509);
            m->items--;
            return;
        }
    }
}

void crtmgr_free(crtmgr *m)
{
    while (m->items)
        crtmgr_del(m, m->crts);
}

static int crtmgr_rsa_verify(cli_crt *x509, mp_int *sig, cli_crt_hashtype hashtype, const uint8_t *refhash)
{
    int keylen = mp_unsigned_bin_size(&x509->n), siglen = mp_unsigned_bin_size(sig);
    int ret, j, objlen, hashlen;
    uint8_t d[513];
    mp_int x;

    if (hashtype == CLI_SHA1RSA) {
        hashlen = SHA1_HASH_SIZE;
    } else if (hashtype == CLI_MD5RSA) {
        hashlen = MD5_HASH_SIZE;
    } else if (hashtype == CLI_SHA256RSA) {
        hashlen = SHA256_HASH_SIZE;
    } else if (hashtype == CLI_SHA384RSA) {
        hashlen = SHA384_HASH_SIZE;
    } else if (hashtype == CLI_SHA512RSA) {
        hashlen = SHA512_HASH_SIZE;
    } else {
        cli_errmsg("crtmgr_rsa_verify: Unsupported hashtype: %d\n", hashtype);
        return 1;
    }

    if ((ret = mp_init(&x))) {
        cli_errmsg("crtmgr_rsa_verify: mp_init failed with %d\n", ret);
        return 1;
    }

    do {
        if (MAX(keylen, siglen) - MIN(keylen, siglen) > 1) {
            cli_dbgmsg("crtmgr_rsa_verify: keylen and siglen differ by more than one\n");
            break;
        }
        if ((ret = mp_exptmod(sig, &x509->e, &x509->n, &x))) {
            cli_warnmsg("crtmgr_rsa_verify: verification failed: mp_exptmod failed with %d\n", ret);
            break;
        }
        if (mp_unsigned_bin_size(&x) != keylen - 1) {
            cli_dbgmsg("crtmgr_rsa_verify: keylen-1 doesn't match expected size of exptmod result\n");
            break;
        }
        if (((unsigned int)mp_unsigned_bin_size(&x)) > sizeof(d)) {
            cli_dbgmsg("crtmgr_rsa_verify: exptmod result would overrun working buffer\n");
            break;
        }
        if ((ret = mp_to_unsigned_bin(&x, d))) {
            cli_warnmsg("crtmgr_rsa_verify: mp_unsigned_bin_size failed with %d\n", ret);
            break;
        }
        if (*d != 1) { /* block type 1 */
            cli_dbgmsg("crtmgr_rsa_verify: expected block type 1 at d[0]\n");
            break;
        }

        keylen -= 1; /* 0xff padding */
        for (j = 1; j < keylen - 2; j++)
            if (d[j] != 0xff)
                break;
        if (j == keylen - 2) {
            cli_dbgmsg("crtmgr_rsa_verify: only encountered 0xFF padding parsing cert\n");
            break;
        }
        if (d[j] != 0) { /* 0x00 separator */
            cli_dbgmsg("crtmgr_rsa_verify: expected 0x00 separator\n");
            break;
        }

        j++;
        keylen -= j; /* asn1 size */

        if (keylen < hashlen) {
            cli_dbgmsg("crtmgr_rsa_verify: encountered keylen less than hashlen\n");
            break;
        }
        if (keylen > hashlen) {
            /* hash is asn1 der encoded */
            /* SEQ { SEQ { OID, NULL }, OCTET STRING */
            if (keylen < 2 || d[j] != 0x30 || d[j + 1] + 2 != keylen) {
                cli_dbgmsg("crtmgr_rsa_verify: unexpected hash to be ASN1 DER encoded\n");
                break;
            }
            keylen -= 2;
            j += 2;

            if (keylen < 2 || d[j] != 0x30) {
                cli_dbgmsg("crtmgr_rsa_verify: expected SEQUENCE at beginning of cert AlgorithmIdentifier\n");
                break;
            }

            objlen = d[j + 1];

            keylen -= 2;
            j += 2;
            if (keylen < objlen) {
                cli_dbgmsg("crtmgr_rsa_verify: key length mismatch in ASN1 DER hash encoding\n");
                break;
            }
            if (objlen == 9) {
                // Check for OID type indicating a length of 5, OID_sha1, and the NULL type/value
                if (hashtype != CLI_SHA1RSA || memcmp(&d[j], "\x06\x05" OID_sha1 "\x05\x00", 9)) {
                    cli_errmsg("crtmgr_rsa_verify: FIXME ACAB - CRYPTO MISSING?\n");
                    break;
                }
            } else if (objlen == 12) {
                // Check for OID type indicating a length of 8, OID_md5, and the NULL type/value
                if (hashtype != CLI_MD5RSA || memcmp(&d[j], "\x06\x08" OID_md5 "\x05\x00", 12)) {
                    cli_errmsg("crtmgr_rsa_verify: FIXME ACAB - CRYPTO MISSING?\n");
                    break;
                }
            } else if (objlen == 13) {
                if (hashtype == CLI_SHA256RSA) {
                    // Check for OID type indicating a length of 9, OID_sha256, and the NULL type/value
                    if (0 != memcmp(&d[j], "\x06\x09" OID_sha256 "\x05\x00", 13)) {
                        cli_dbgmsg("crtmgr_rsa_verify: invalid AlgorithmIdentifier block for SHA256 hash\n");
                        break;
                    }

                } else if (hashtype == CLI_SHA384RSA) {
                    // Check for OID type indicating a length of 9, OID_sha384, and the NULL type/value
                    if (0 != memcmp(&d[j], "\x06\x09" OID_sha384 "\x05\x00", 13)) {
                        cli_dbgmsg("crtmgr_rsa_verify: invalid AlgorithmIdentifier block for SHA384 hash\n");
                        break;
                    }

                } else if (hashtype == CLI_SHA512RSA) {
                    // Check for OID type indicating a length of 9, OID_sha512, and the NULL type/value
                    if (0 != memcmp(&d[j], "\x06\x09" OID_sha512 "\x05\x00", 13)) {
                        cli_dbgmsg("crtmgr_rsa_verify: invalid AlgorithmIdentifier block for SHA512 hash\n");
                        break;
                    }

                } else {
                    cli_errmsg("crtmgr_rsa_verify: FIXME ACAB - CRYPTO MISSING?\n");
                    break;
                }
            } else {
                cli_errmsg("crtmgr_rsa_verify: FIXME ACAB - CRYPTO MISSING?\n");
                break;
            }

            keylen -= objlen;
            j += objlen;
            if (keylen < 2 || d[j] != 0x04 || d[j + 1] != hashlen) {
                cli_dbgmsg("crtmgr_rsa_verify: hash length mismatch in ASN1 DER hash encoding\n");
                break;
            }
            keylen -= 2;
            j += 2;
            if (keylen != hashlen) {
                cli_dbgmsg("crtmgr_rsa_verify: extra data in the ASN1 DER hash encoding\n");
                break;
            }
        }
        if (memcmp(&d[j], refhash, hashlen)) {
            // This is a common error case if we are using crtmgr_rsa_verify to
            // determine whether we've found the right issuer certificate based
            // (as is done by crtmgr_verify_crt).  If we are pretty sure that
            // x509 is the correct cert to use for verification, then this
            // case is more of a concern.
            break;
        }

        mp_clear(&x);
        return 0;

    } while (0);

    mp_clear(&x);
    return 1;
}

/* For a given cli_crt, returns a pointer to the signer x509 certificate if
 * one is found in the crtmgr and it's signature can be validated (NULL is
 * returned otherwise.) */
cli_crt *crtmgr_verify_crt(crtmgr *m, cli_crt *x509)
{
    cli_crt *i = m->crts, *best = NULL;
    int score             = 0;
    unsigned int possible = 0;

    // Loop through each of the certificates in our trust store and see whether
    // x509 is signed with it.  If it is, it's trusted

    // TODO Technically we should loop through all of the blacklisted certs
    // first to see whether one of those is used to sign x509.  This case
    // will get handled if the blacklisted certificate is embedded, since we
    // will call crtmgr_verify_crt on it and match against the blacklist entry
    // that way, but the cert doesn't HAVE to be embedded.  This case seems
    // unlikely enough to ignore, though.  If we ever want to blacklist a
    // stolen CA cert or something, then we will need to revisit this.

    for (i = m->crts; i; i = i->next) {
        if (i->certSign &&
            !i->isBlacklisted &&
            !memcmp(i->subject, x509->issuer, sizeof(i->subject)) &&
            !crtmgr_rsa_verify(i, &x509->sig, x509->hashtype, x509->tbshash)) {
            int curscore;
            if ((x509->codeSign & i->codeSign) == x509->codeSign && (x509->timeSign & i->timeSign) == x509->timeSign)
                return i;
            possible++;
            curscore = (x509->codeSign & i->codeSign) + (x509->timeSign & i->timeSign);
            if (curscore > score) {
                best  = i;
                score = curscore;
            }
        }
    }

    if (possible > 1) {
        // If this is ever triggered, it's probably an indication of an error
        // in the CRB being used.
        cli_warnmsg("crtmgr_verify_crt: choosing between codeSign cert and timeSign cert without enough info - errors may result\n");
    }
    return best;
}

cli_crt *crtmgr_verify_pkcs7(crtmgr *m, const uint8_t *issuer, const uint8_t *serial, const void *signature, unsigned int signature_len, cli_crt_hashtype hashtype, const uint8_t *refhash, cli_vrfy_type vrfytype)
{
    cli_crt *i;
    mp_int sig;
    int ret;

    if (signature_len < 1024 / 8 || signature_len > 4096 / 8 + 1) {
        cli_dbgmsg("crtmgr_verify_pkcs7: unsupported sig len: %u\n", signature_len);
        return NULL;
    }
    if ((ret = mp_init(&sig))) {
        cli_dbgmsg("crtmgr_verify_pkcs7: mp_init failed with %d\n", ret);
        return NULL;
    }

    if ((ret = mp_read_unsigned_bin(&sig, signature, signature_len))) {
        cli_dbgmsg("crtmgr_verify_pkcs7: mp_read_unsigned_bin failed with %d\n", ret);
        return NULL;
    }

    for (i = m->crts; i; i = i->next) {
        if (vrfytype == VRFY_CODE && !i->codeSign)
            continue;
        if (vrfytype == VRFY_TIME && !i->timeSign)
            continue;
        if (!memcmp(i->issuer, issuer, sizeof(i->issuer)) &&
            !memcmp(i->serial, serial, sizeof(i->serial))) {
            if (!crtmgr_rsa_verify(i, &sig, hashtype, refhash)) {
                break;
            }
            cli_dbgmsg("crtmgr_verify_pkcs7: found cert with matching issuer and serial but RSA verification failed\n");
        }
    }
    mp_clear(&sig);
    return i;
}

int crtmgr_add_roots(struct cl_engine *engine, crtmgr *m, int exclude_bl_crts)
{
    cli_crt *crt;
    /*
     * Certs are cached in engine->cmgr. Copy from there.
     */
    if (m != &(engine->cmgr)) {
        for (crt = engine->cmgr.crts; crt != NULL; crt = crt->next) {
            if (exclude_bl_crts && crt->isBlacklisted) {
                continue;
            }
            if (crtmgr_add(m, crt)) {
                crtmgr_free(m);
                return 1;
            }
        }

        return 0;
    }

    return 0;
}