/*
* OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks
* over a single TCP/UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based
* session authentication and key exchange,
* packet encryption, packet authentication, and
* packet compression.
*
* Copyright (C) 2002-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. <sales@openvpn.net>
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2
* as published by the Free Software Foundation.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
* GNU General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this
* distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc.,
* 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA
*/
#ifndef OPENVPN_SSL_H
#define OPENVPN_SSL_H
#if defined(USE_CRYPTO) && defined(USE_SSL)
#include <openssl/ssl.h>
#include <openssl/bio.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include <openssl/pkcs12.h>
#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
#include "basic.h"
#include "common.h"
#include "crypto.h"
#include "packet_id.h"
#include "session_id.h"
#include "reliable.h"
#include "socket.h"
#include "mtu.h"
#include "thread.h"
#include "options.h"
#include "plugin.h"
/*
* OpenVPN Protocol, taken from ssl.h in OpenVPN source code.
*
* TCP/UDP Packet: This represents the top-level encapsulation.
*
* TCP/UDP packet format:
*
* Packet length (16 bits, unsigned) -- TCP only, always sent as
* plaintext. Since TCP is a stream protocol, the packet
* length words define the packetization of the stream.
*
* Packet opcode/key_id (8 bits) -- TLS only, not used in
* pre-shared secret mode.
* packet message type, a P_* constant (high 5 bits)
* key_id (low 3 bits, see key_id in struct tls_session
* below for comment). The key_id refers to an
* already negotiated TLS session. OpenVPN seamlessly
* renegotiates the TLS session by using a new key_id
* for the new session. Overlap (controlled by
* user definable parameters) between old and new TLS
* sessions is allowed, providing a seamless transition
* during tunnel operation.
*
* Payload (n bytes), which may be a P_CONTROL, P_ACK, or P_DATA
* message.
*
* Message types:
*
* P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_CLIENT_V1 -- Key method 1, initial key from
* client, forget previous state.
*
* P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_SERVER_V1 -- Key method 2, initial key
* from server, forget previous state.
*
* P_CONTROL_SOFT_RESET_V1 -- New key, with a graceful transition
* from old to new key in the sense that a transition window
* exists where both the old or new key_id can be used. OpenVPN
* uses two different forms of key_id. The first form is 64 bits
* and is used for all P_CONTROL messages. P_DATA messages on the
* other hand use a shortened key_id of 3 bits for efficiency
* reasons since the vast majority of OpenVPN packets in an
* active tunnel will be P_DATA messages. The 64 bit form
* is referred to as a session_id, while the 3 bit form is
* referred to as a key_id.
*
* P_CONTROL_V1 -- Control channel packet (usually TLS ciphertext).
*
* P_ACK_V1 -- Acknowledgement for P_CONTROL packets received.
*
* P_DATA_V1 -- Data channel packet containing actual tunnel data
* ciphertext.
*
* P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_CLIENT_V2 -- Key method 2, initial key from
* client, forget previous state.
*
* P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_SERVER_V2 -- Key method 2, initial key from
* server, forget previous state.
*
* P_CONTROL* and P_ACK Payload: The P_CONTROL message type
* indicates a TLS ciphertext packet which has been encapsulated
* inside of a reliability layer. The reliability layer is
* implemented as a straightforward ACK and retransmit model.
*
* P_CONTROL message format:
*
* local session_id (random 64 bit value to identify TLS session).
* HMAC signature of entire encapsulation header for integrity
* check if --tls-auth is specified (usually 16 or 20 bytes).
* packet-id for replay protection (4 or 8 bytes, includes
* sequence number and optional time_t timestamp).
* P_ACK packet_id array length (1 byte).
* P_ACK packet-id array (if length > 0).
* P_ACK remote session_id (if length > 0).
* message packet-id (4 bytes).
* TLS payload ciphertext (n bytes) (only for P_CONTROL).
*
* Once the TLS session has been initialized and authenticated,
* the TLS channel is used to exchange random key material for
* bidirectional cipher and HMAC keys which will be
* used to secure actual tunnel packets. OpenVPN currently
* implements two key methods. Key method 1 directly
* derives keys using random bits obtained from the RAND_bytes
* OpenSSL function. Key method 2 mixes random key material
* from both sides of the connection using the TLS PRF mixing
* function. Key method 2 is the preferred method and is the default
* for OpenVPN 2.0.
*
* TLS plaintext content:
*
* TLS plaintext packet (if key_method == 1):
*
* Cipher key length in bytes (1 byte).
* Cipher key (n bytes).
* HMAC key length in bytes (1 byte).
* HMAC key (n bytes).
* Options string (n bytes, null terminated, client/server options
* string should match).
*
* TLS plaintext packet (if key_method == 2):
*
* Literal 0 (4 bytes).
* key_method type (1 byte).
* key_source structure (pre_master only defined for client ->
* server).
* options_string_length, including null (2 bytes).
* Options string (n bytes, null terminated, client/server options
* string must match).
* [The username/password data below is optional, record can end
* at this point.]
* username_string_length, including null (2 bytes).
* Username string (n bytes, null terminated).
* password_string_length, including null (2 bytes).
* Password string (n bytes, null terminated).
*
* The P_DATA payload represents encrypted, encapsulated tunnel
* packets which tend to be either IP packets or Ethernet frames.
* This is essentially the "payload" of the VPN.
*
* P_DATA message content:
* HMAC of ciphertext IV + ciphertext (if not disabled by
* --auth none).
* Ciphertext IV (size is cipher-dependent, if not disabled by
* --no-iv).
* Tunnel packet ciphertext.
*
* P_DATA plaintext
* packet_id (4 or 8 bytes, if not disabled by --no-replay).
* In SSL/TLS mode, 4 bytes are used because the implementation
* can force a TLS renegotation before 2^32 packets are sent.
* In pre-shared key mode, 8 bytes are used (sequence number
* and time_t value) to allow long-term key usage without
* packet_id collisions.
* User plaintext (n bytes).
*
* Notes:
* (1) ACK messages can be encoded in either the dedicated
* P_ACK record or they can be prepended to a P_CONTROL message.
* (2) P_DATA and P_CONTROL/P_ACK use independent packet-id
* sequences because P_DATA is an unreliable channel while
* P_CONTROL/P_ACK is a reliable channel. Each use their
* own independent HMAC keys.
* (3) Note that when --tls-auth is used, all message types are
* protected with an HMAC signature, even the initial packets
* of the TLS handshake. This makes it easy for OpenVPN to
* throw away bogus packets quickly, without wasting resources
* on attempting a TLS handshake which will ultimately fail.
*/
/* Used in the TLS PRF function */
#define KEY_EXPANSION_ID "OpenVPN"
/* passwords */
#define UP_TYPE_AUTH "Auth"
#define UP_TYPE_PRIVATE_KEY "Private Key"
/* packet opcode (high 5 bits) and key-id (low 3 bits) are combined in one byte */
#define P_KEY_ID_MASK 0x07
#define P_OPCODE_SHIFT 3
/* packet opcodes -- the V1 is intended to allow protocol changes in the future */
#define P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_CLIENT_V1 1 /* initial key from client, forget previous state */
#define P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_SERVER_V1 2 /* initial key from server, forget previous state */
#define P_CONTROL_SOFT_RESET_V1 3 /* new key, graceful transition from old to new key */
#define P_CONTROL_V1 4 /* control channel packet (usually TLS ciphertext) */
#define P_ACK_V1 5 /* acknowledgement for packets received */
#define P_DATA_V1 6 /* data channel packet */
/* indicates key_method >= 2 */
#define P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_CLIENT_V2 7 /* initial key from client, forget previous state */
#define P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_SERVER_V2 8 /* initial key from server, forget previous state */
/* define the range of legal opcodes */
#define P_FIRST_OPCODE 1
#define P_LAST_OPCODE 8
/* key negotiation states */
#define S_ERROR -1
#define S_UNDEF 0
#define S_INITIAL 1 /* tls_init() was called */
#define S_PRE_START 2 /* waiting for initial reset & acknowledgement */
#define S_START 3 /* ready to exchange keys */
#define S_SENT_KEY 4 /* client does S_SENT_KEY -> S_GOT_KEY */
#define S_GOT_KEY 5 /* server does S_GOT_KEY -> S_SENT_KEY */
#define S_ACTIVE 6 /* ready to exchange data channel packets */
#define S_NORMAL_OP 7 /* normal operations */
/*
* Are we ready to receive data channel packets?
*
* Also, if true, we can safely assume session has been
* authenticated by TLS.
*
* NOTE: Assumes S_SENT_KEY + 1 == S_GOT_KEY.
*/
#define DECRYPT_KEY_ENABLED(multi, ks) ((ks)->state >= (S_GOT_KEY - (multi)->opt.server))
/* Should we aggregate TLS acknowledgements, and tack them onto control packets? */
#define TLS_AGGREGATE_ACK
/*
* If TLS_AGGREGATE_ACK, set the
* max number of acknowledgments that
* can "hitch a ride" on an outgoing
* non-P_ACK_V1 control packet.
*/
#define CONTROL_SEND_ACK_MAX 4
/*
* Define number of buffers for send and receive in the reliability layer.
*/
#define TLS_RELIABLE_N_SEND_BUFFERS 4 /* also window size for reliablity layer */
#define TLS_RELIABLE_N_REC_BUFFERS 8
/*
* Various timeouts
*/
#define TLS_MULTI_REFRESH 15 /* call tls_multi_process once every n seconds */
#define TLS_MULTI_HORIZON 2 /* call tls_multi_process frequently for n seconds after
every packet sent/received action */
/* The SSL/TLS worker thread will wait at most this many seconds for the interprocess
communication pipe to the main thread to be ready to accept writes. */
#define TLS_MULTI_THREAD_SEND_TIMEOUT 5
/* Interval that tls_multi_process should call tls_authentication_status */
#define TLS_MULTI_AUTH_STATUS_INTERVAL 10
/*
* Buffer sizes (also see mtu.h).
*/
/* Maximum length of the username in cert */
#define TLS_USERNAME_LEN 64
/* Legal characters in an X509 or common name */
#define X509_NAME_CHAR_CLASS (CC_ALNUM|CC_UNDERBAR|CC_DASH|CC_DOT|CC_AT|CC_COLON|CC_SLASH|CC_EQUAL)
#define COMMON_NAME_CHAR_CLASS (CC_ALNUM|CC_UNDERBAR|CC_DASH|CC_DOT|CC_AT|CC_SLASH)
/* Maximum length of OCC options string passed as part of auth handshake */
#define TLS_OPTIONS_LEN 512
/* Default field in X509 to be username */
#define X509_USERNAME_FIELD_DEFAULT "CN"
/*
* Range of key exchange methods
*/
#define KEY_METHOD_MIN 1
#define KEY_METHOD_MAX 2
/* key method taken from lower 4 bits */
#define KEY_METHOD_MASK 0x0F
/*
* Measure success rate of TLS handshakes, for debugging only
*/
/* #define MEASURE_TLS_HANDSHAKE_STATS */
/*
* Keep track of certificate hashes at various depths
*/
/* Maximum certificate depth we will allow */
#define MAX_CERT_DEPTH 16
struct cert_hash {
unsigned char sha1_hash[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
};
struct cert_hash_set {
struct cert_hash *ch[MAX_CERT_DEPTH];
};
/*
* Key material, used as source for PRF-based
* key expansion.
*/
struct key_source {
uint8_t pre_master[48]; /* client generated */
uint8_t random1[32]; /* generated by both client and server */
uint8_t random2[32]; /* generated by both client and server */
};
struct key_source2 {
struct key_source client;
struct key_source server;
};
/*
* Represents a single instantiation of a TLS negotiation and
* data channel key exchange. 4 keys are kept: encrypt hmac,
* decrypt hmac, encrypt cipher, and decrypt cipher. The TLS
* control channel is used to exchange these keys.
* Each hard or soft reset will build
* a fresh key_state. Normally an openvpn session will contain two
* key_state objects, one for the current TLS connection, and other
* for the retiring or "lame duck" key. The lame duck key_state is
* used to maintain transmission continuity on the data-channel while
* a key renegotiation is taking place.
*/
struct key_state
{
int state;
int key_id; /* inherited from struct tls_session below */
SSL *ssl; /* SSL object -- new obj created for each new key */
BIO *ssl_bio; /* read/write plaintext from here */
BIO *ct_in; /* write ciphertext to here */
BIO *ct_out; /* read ciphertext from here */
time_t established; /* when our state went S_ACTIVE */
time_t must_negotiate; /* key negotiation times out if not finished before this time */
time_t must_die; /* this object is destroyed at this time */
int initial_opcode; /* our initial P_ opcode */
struct session_id session_id_remote; /* peer's random session ID */
struct link_socket_actual remote_addr; /* peer's IP addr */
struct packet_id packet_id; /* for data channel, to prevent replay attacks */
struct key_ctx_bi key; /* data channel keys for encrypt/decrypt/hmac */
struct key_source2 *key_src; /* source entropy for key expansion */
struct buffer plaintext_read_buf;
struct buffer plaintext_write_buf;
struct buffer ack_write_buf;
struct reliable *send_reliable; /* holds a copy of outgoing packets until ACK received */
struct reliable *rec_reliable; /* order incoming ciphertext packets before we pass to TLS */
struct reliable_ack *rec_ack; /* buffers all packet IDs we want to ACK back to sender */
struct buffer_list *paybuf;
counter_type n_bytes; /* how many bytes sent/recvd since last key exchange */
counter_type n_packets; /* how many packets sent/recvd since last key exchange */
/*
* If bad username/password, TLS connection will come up but 'authenticated' will be false.
*/
bool authenticated;
time_t auth_deferred_expire;
#ifdef ENABLE_DEF_AUTH
/* If auth_deferred is true, authentication is being deferred */
bool auth_deferred;
#ifdef MANAGEMENT_DEF_AUTH
unsigned int mda_key_id;
unsigned int mda_status;
#endif
#ifdef PLUGIN_DEF_AUTH
unsigned int auth_control_status;
time_t acf_last_mod;
char *auth_control_file;
#endif
#endif
};
/*
* Our const options, obtained directly or derived from
* command line options.
*/
struct tls_options
{
/* our master SSL_CTX from which all SSL objects derived */
SSL_CTX *ssl_ctx;
/* data channel cipher, hmac, and key lengths */
struct key_type key_type;
/* true if we are a TLS server, client otherwise */
bool server;
/* if true, don't xmit until first packet from peer is received */
bool xmit_hold;
#ifdef ENABLE_OCC
/* local and remote options strings
that must match between client and server */
const char *local_options;
const char *remote_options;
#endif
/* from command line */
int key_method;
bool replay;
bool single_session;
#ifdef ENABLE_OCC
bool disable_occ;
#endif
#ifdef ENABLE_PUSH_PEER_INFO
bool push_peer_info;
#endif
int transition_window;
int handshake_window;
interval_t packet_timeout;
int renegotiate_bytes;
int renegotiate_packets;
interval_t renegotiate_seconds;
/* cert verification parms */
const char *verify_command;
const char *verify_export_cert;
const char *verify_x509name;
const char *crl_file;
int ns_cert_type;
unsigned remote_cert_ku[MAX_PARMS];
const char *remote_cert_eku;
/* allow openvpn config info to be
passed over control channel */
bool pass_config_info;
/* struct crypto_option flags */
unsigned int crypto_flags_and;
unsigned int crypto_flags_or;
int replay_window; /* --replay-window parm */
int replay_time; /* --replay-window parm */
/* packet authentication for TLS handshake */
struct crypto_options tls_auth;
struct key_ctx_bi tls_auth_key;
/* frame parameters for TLS control channel */
struct frame frame;
/* used for username/password authentication */
const char *auth_user_pass_verify_script;
bool auth_user_pass_verify_script_via_file;
const char *tmp_dir;
/* use the client-config-dir as a positive authenticator */
const char *client_config_dir_exclusive;
/* instance-wide environment variable set */
struct env_set *es;
const struct plugin_list *plugins;
/* configuration file boolean options */
# define SSLF_CLIENT_CERT_NOT_REQUIRED (1<<0)
# define SSLF_USERNAME_AS_COMMON_NAME (1<<1)
# define SSLF_AUTH_USER_PASS_OPTIONAL (1<<2)
# define SSLF_NO_NAME_REMAPPING (1<<3)
# define SSLF_OPT_VERIFY (1<<4)
unsigned int ssl_flags;
#ifdef MANAGEMENT_DEF_AUTH
struct man_def_auth_context *mda_context;
#endif
/* --gremlin bits */
int gremlin;
};
/* index into tls_session.key */
#define KS_PRIMARY 0 /* the primary key */
#define KS_LAME_DUCK 1 /* the key that's going to retire soon */
#define KS_SIZE 2
/*
* A tls_session lives through multiple key_state life-cycles. Soft resets
* will reuse a tls_session object, but hard resets or errors will require
* that a fresh object be built. Normally three tls_session objects are maintained
* by an active openvpn session. The first is the current, TLS authenticated
* session, the second is used to process connection requests from a new
* client that would usurp the current session if successfully authenticated,
* and the third is used as a repository for a "lame-duck" key in the event
* that the primary session resets due to error while the lame-duck key still
* has time left before its expiration. Lame duck keys are used to maintain
* the continuity of the data channel connection while a new key is being
* negotiated.
*/
struct tls_session
{
/* const options and config info */
const struct tls_options *opt;
/* during hard reset used to control burst retransmit */
bool burst;
/* authenticate control packets */
struct crypto_options tls_auth;
struct packet_id tls_auth_pid;
int initial_opcode; /* our initial P_ opcode */
struct session_id session_id; /* our random session ID */
int key_id; /* increments with each soft reset (for key renegotiation) */
int limit_next; /* used for traffic shaping on the control channel */
int verify_maxlevel;
char *common_name;
struct cert_hash_set *cert_hash_set;
#ifdef ENABLE_PF
uint32_t common_name_hashval;
#endif
bool verified; /* true if peer certificate was verified against CA */
/* not-yet-authenticated incoming client */
struct link_socket_actual untrusted_addr;
struct key_state key[KS_SIZE];
};
/* index into tls_multi.session */
#define TM_ACTIVE 0
#define TM_UNTRUSTED 1
#define TM_LAME_DUCK 2
#define TM_SIZE 3
/*
* The number of keys we will scan on encrypt or decrypt. The first
* is the "active" key. The second is the lame_duck or retiring key
* associated with the active key's session ID. The third is a detached
* lame duck session that only occurs in situations where a key renegotiate
* failed on the active key, but a lame duck key was still valid. By
* preserving the lame duck session, we can be assured of having a data
* channel key available even when network conditions are so bad that
* we can't negotiate a new key within the time allotted.
*/
#define KEY_SCAN_SIZE 3
/*
* An openvpn session running with TLS enabled has one tls_multi object.
*/
struct tls_multi
{
/* used to coordinate access between main thread and TLS thread */
/*MUTEX_PTR_DEFINE (mutex);*/
/* const options and config info */
struct tls_options opt;
/*
* A list of key_state objects in the order they should be
* scanned by data channel encrypt and decrypt routines.
*/
struct key_state* key_scan[KEY_SCAN_SIZE];
/*
* used by tls_pre_encrypt to communicate the encrypt key
* to tls_post_encrypt()
*/
struct key_state *save_ks; /* temporary pointer used between pre/post routines */
/*
* Used to return outgoing address from
* tls_multi_process.
*/
struct link_socket_actual to_link_addr;
/*
* Number of sessions negotiated thus far.
*/
int n_sessions;
/*
* Number of errors.
*/
int n_hard_errors; /* errors due to TLS negotiation failure */
int n_soft_errors; /* errors due to unrecognized or failed-to-authenticate incoming packets */
/*
* Our locked common name, username, and cert hashes (cannot change during the life of this tls_multi object)
*/
char *locked_cn;
char *locked_username;
struct cert_hash_set *locked_cert_hash_set;
#ifdef ENABLE_DEF_AUTH
/*
* An error message to send to client on AUTH_FAILED
*/
char *client_reason;
/*
* A multi-line string of general-purpose info received from peer
* over control channel.
*/
char *peer_info;
/* Time of last call to tls_authentication_status */
time_t tas_last;
#endif
/*
* Our session objects.
*/
struct tls_session session[TM_SIZE];
};
/*
* Used in --mode server mode to check tls-auth signature on initial
* packets received from new clients.
*/
struct tls_auth_standalone
{
struct key_ctx_bi tls_auth_key;
struct crypto_options tls_auth_options;
struct frame frame;
};
void init_ssl_lib (void);
void free_ssl_lib (void);
/* Build master SSL_CTX object that serves for the whole of openvpn instantiation */
SSL_CTX *init_ssl (const struct options *options);
struct tls_multi *tls_multi_init (struct tls_options *tls_options);
struct tls_auth_standalone *tls_auth_standalone_init (struct tls_options *tls_options,
struct gc_arena *gc);
void tls_auth_standalone_finalize (struct tls_auth_standalone *tas,
const struct frame *frame);
void tls_multi_init_finalize(struct tls_multi *multi,
const struct frame *frame);
void tls_multi_init_set_options(struct tls_multi* multi,
const char *local,
const char *remote);
#define TLSMP_INACTIVE 0
#define TLSMP_ACTIVE 1
#define TLSMP_KILL 2
int tls_multi_process (struct tls_multi *multi,
struct buffer *to_link,
struct link_socket_actual **to_link_addr,
struct link_socket_info *to_link_socket_info,
interval_t *wakeup);
void tls_multi_free (struct tls_multi *multi, bool clear);
bool tls_pre_decrypt (struct tls_multi *multi,
const struct link_socket_actual *from,
struct buffer *buf,
struct crypto_options *opt);
bool tls_pre_decrypt_lite (const struct tls_auth_standalone *tas,
const struct link_socket_actual *from,
const struct buffer *buf);
void tls_pre_encrypt (struct tls_multi *multi,
struct buffer *buf, struct crypto_options *opt);
void tls_post_encrypt (struct tls_multi *multi, struct buffer *buf);
void show_available_tls_ciphers (void);
void get_highest_preference_tls_cipher (char *buf, int size);
void pem_password_setup (const char *auth_file);
int pem_password_callback (char *buf, int size, int rwflag, void *u);
void auth_user_pass_setup (const char *auth_file);
void ssl_set_auth_nocache (void);
void ssl_purge_auth (void);
void tls_set_verify_command (const char *cmd);
void tls_set_crl_verify (const char *crl);
void tls_set_verify_x509name (const char *x509name);
void tls_adjust_frame_parameters(struct frame *frame);
bool tls_send_payload (struct tls_multi *multi,
const uint8_t *data,
int size);
bool tls_rec_payload (struct tls_multi *multi,
struct buffer *buf);
const char *tls_common_name (const struct tls_multi* multi, const bool null);
void tls_set_common_name (struct tls_multi *multi, const char *common_name);
void tls_lock_common_name (struct tls_multi *multi);
void tls_lock_cert_hash_set (struct tls_multi *multi);
#define TLS_AUTHENTICATION_SUCCEEDED 0
#define TLS_AUTHENTICATION_FAILED 1
#define TLS_AUTHENTICATION_DEFERRED 2
#define TLS_AUTHENTICATION_UNDEFINED 3
int tls_authentication_status (struct tls_multi *multi, const int latency);
void tls_deauthenticate (struct tls_multi *multi);
#ifdef MANAGEMENT_DEF_AUTH
bool tls_authenticate_key (struct tls_multi *multi, const unsigned int mda_key_id, const bool auth, const char *client_reason);
static inline char *
tls_get_peer_info(const struct tls_multi *multi)
{
return multi->peer_info;
}
#endif
/*
* inline functions
*/
static inline bool
tls_initial_packet_received (const struct tls_multi *multi)
{
return multi->n_sessions > 0;
}
static inline bool
tls_test_auth_deferred_interval (const struct tls_multi *multi)
{
if (multi)
{
const struct key_state *ks = &multi->session[TM_ACTIVE].key[KS_PRIMARY];
return now < ks->auth_deferred_expire;
}
return false;
}
static inline int
tls_test_payload_len (const struct tls_multi *multi)
{
if (multi)
{
const struct key_state *ks = &multi->session[TM_ACTIVE].key[KS_PRIMARY];
if (ks->state >= S_ACTIVE)
return BLEN (&ks->plaintext_read_buf);
}
return 0;
}
static inline void
tls_set_single_session (struct tls_multi *multi)
{
if (multi)
multi->opt.single_session = true;
}
static inline const char *
tls_client_reason (struct tls_multi *multi)
{
#ifdef ENABLE_DEF_AUTH
return multi->client_reason;
#else
return NULL;
#endif
}
#ifdef ENABLE_PF
static inline bool
tls_common_name_hash (const struct tls_multi *multi, const char **cn, uint32_t *cn_hash)
{
if (multi)
{
const struct tls_session *s = &multi->session[TM_ACTIVE];
if (s->common_name && s->common_name[0] != '\0')
{
*cn = s->common_name;
*cn_hash = s->common_name_hashval;
return true;
}
}
return false;
}
#endif
/*
* protocol_dump() flags
*/
#define PD_TLS_AUTH_HMAC_SIZE_MASK 0xFF
#define PD_SHOW_DATA (1<<8)
#define PD_TLS (1<<9)
#define PD_VERBOSE (1<<10)
const char *protocol_dump (struct buffer *buffer,
unsigned int flags,
struct gc_arena *gc);
/*
* debugging code
*/
#ifdef MEASURE_TLS_HANDSHAKE_STATS
void show_tls_performance_stats(void);
#endif
/*#define EXTRACT_X509_FIELD_TEST*/
void extract_x509_field_test (void);
#endif /* USE_CRYPTO && USE_SSL */
#endif