@@ -985,7 +985,8 @@ is_openvpn_protocol(const struct buffer *buf)

     {

         return p[0] == 0

                && p[1] >= 14

-               && p[2] == (P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_CLIENT_V2<<P_OPCODE_SHIFT);

+               && (p[2] == (P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_CLIENT_V2 << P_OPCODE_SHIFT)

+                   || p[2] == (P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_CLIENT_V3 << P_OPCODE_SHIFT));

     }

     else if (len >= 2)

     {

@@ -785,6 +785,9 @@ packet_opcode_name(int op)

         case P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_SERVER_V2:

             return "P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_SERVER_V2";

+        case P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_CLIENT_V3:

+            return "P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_CLIENT_V3";

+

         case P_CONTROL_SOFT_RESET_V1:

             return "P_CONTROL_SOFT_RESET_V1";

@@ -857,7 +860,8 @@ is_hard_reset(int op, int key_method)

     if (!key_method || key_method >= 2)

     {

-        if (op == P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_CLIENT_V2 || op == P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_SERVER_V2)

+        if (op == P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_CLIENT_V2 || op == P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_SERVER_V2

+            || op == P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_CLIENT_V3)

         {

             return true;

         }

@@ -1088,8 +1092,15 @@ tls_session_init(struct tls_multi *multi, struct tls_session *session)

     }

     else /* session->opt->key_method >= 2 */

     {

-        session->initial_opcode = session->opt->server ?

-                                  P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_SERVER_V2 : P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_CLIENT_V2;

+        if (session->opt->server)

+        {

+            session->initial_opcode = P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_SERVER_V2;

+        }

+        else

+        {

+            session->initial_opcode = session->opt->tls_crypt_v2 ?

+                    P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_CLIENT_V3 : P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_CLIENT_V2;

+        }

     }

     /* Initialize control channel authentication parameters */

@@ -3420,7 +3431,8 @@ tls_pre_decrypt(struct tls_multi *multi,

             {

                 /* verify client -> server or server -> client connection */

                 if (((op == P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_CLIENT_V1

-                      || op == P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_CLIENT_V2) && !multi->opt.server)

+                      || op == P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_CLIENT_V2

+                      || op == P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_CLIENT_V3) && !multi->opt.server)

                     || ((op == P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_SERVER_V1

                          || op == P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_SERVER_V2) && multi->opt.server))

                 {

@@ -3805,7 +3817,8 @@ tls_pre_decrypt_lite(const struct tls_auth_standalone *tas,

         /* this packet is from an as-yet untrusted source, so

          * scrutinize carefully */

-        if (op != P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_CLIENT_V2)

+        if (op != P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_CLIENT_V2

+            && op != P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_CLIENT_V3)

         {

             /*

              * This can occur due to bogus data or DoS packets.

@@ -63,9 +63,12 @@

 #define P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_CLIENT_V2 7     /* initial key from client, forget previous state */

 #define P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_SERVER_V2 8     /* initial key from server, forget previous state */

+/* indicates key_method >= 2 and client-specific tls-crypt key */

+#define P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_CLIENT_V3 10    /* initial key from client, forget previous state */

+

 /* define the range of legal opcodes */

 #define P_FIRST_OPCODE                 1

-#define P_LAST_OPCODE                  9

+#define P_LAST_OPCODE                  10

 /*

  * Set the max number of acknowledgments that can "hitch a ride" on an outgoing

@@ -286,6 +286,8 @@ struct tls_options

     const char *config_authname;

     bool ncp_enabled;

+    bool tls_crypt_v2;

+

     /** TLS handshake wrapping state */

     struct tls_wrap_ctx tls_wrap;