new file mode 100644

@@ -0,0 +1,323 @@

+From 511563ce763b1e98e3fb3b3e3addfef550ff99b2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001

+From: Tobias Brunner <tobias@strongswan.org>

+Date: Tue, 28 Aug 2018 11:26:24 +0200

+Subject: [PATCH] gmp: Don't parse PKCS1 v1.5 RSA signatures to verify them

+

+Instead we generate the expected signature encoding and compare it to the

+decrypted value.

+

+Due to the lenient nature of the previous parsing code (minimum padding

+length was not enforced, the algorithmIdentifier/OID parser accepts arbitrary

+data after OIDs and in the parameters field etc.) it was susceptible to

+Daniel Bleichenbacher's low-exponent attack (from 2006!), which allowed

+forging signatures for keys that use low public exponents (i.e. e=3).

+

+Since the public exponent is usually set to 0x10001 (65537) since quite a

+while, the flaws in the previous code should not have had that much of a

+practical impact in recent years.

+

+Fixes: CVE-2018-16151, CVE-2018-16152

+---

+ .../plugins/gmp/gmp_rsa_private_key.c              |  66 +++++----

+ src/libstrongswan/plugins/gmp/gmp_rsa_public_key.c | 156 ++-------------------

+ 2 files changed, 52 insertions(+), 170 deletions(-)

+

+diff --git a/src/libstrongswan/plugins/gmp/gmp_rsa_private_key.c b/src/libstrongswan/plugins/gmp/gmp_rsa_private_key.c

+index 241ef7d3b12b..edc178e96a4f 100644

+--- a/src/libstrongswan/plugins/gmp/gmp_rsa_private_key.c

+@@ -264,14 +264,15 @@ static chunk_t rsasp1(private_gmp_rsa_private_key_t *this, chunk_t data)

+ }

+ 

+ /**

+- * Build a signature using the PKCS#1 EMSA scheme

++ * Hashes the data and builds the plaintext signature value with EMSA

++ * PKCS#1 v1.5 padding.

++ *

++ * Allocates the signature data.

+  */

+-static bool build_emsa_pkcs1_signature(private_gmp_rsa_private_key_t *this,

+-									   hash_algorithm_t hash_algorithm,

+-									   chunk_t data, chunk_t *signature)

++bool gmp_emsa_pkcs1_signature_data(hash_algorithm_t hash_algorithm,

++								   chunk_t data, size_t keylen, chunk_t *em)

+ {

+ 	chunk_t digestInfo = chunk_empty;

+-	chunk_t em;

+ 

+ 	if (hash_algorithm != HASH_UNKNOWN)

+ 	{

+@@ -295,43 +296,56 @@ static bool build_emsa_pkcs1_signature(private_gmp_rsa_private_key_t *this,

+ 		/* build DER-encoded digestInfo */

+ 		digestInfo = asn1_wrap(ASN1_SEQUENCE, "mm",

+ 						asn1_algorithmIdentifier(hash_oid),

+-						asn1_simple_object(ASN1_OCTET_STRING, hash)

+-					  );

+-		chunk_free(&hash);

++						asn1_wrap(ASN1_OCTET_STRING, "m", hash));

++

+ 		data = digestInfo;

+ 	}

+ 

+-	if (data.len > this->k - 3)

++	if (data.len > keylen - 11)

+ 	{

+-		free(digestInfo.ptr);

+-		DBG1(DBG_LIB, "unable to sign %d bytes using a %dbit key", data.len,

+-			 mpz_sizeinbase(this->n, 2));

++		chunk_free(&digestInfo);

++		DBG1(DBG_LIB, "signature value of %zu bytes is too long for key of "

++			 "%zu bytes", data.len, keylen);

+ 		return FALSE;

+ 	}

+ 

+-	/* build chunk to rsa-decrypt:

+-	 * EM = 0x00 || 0x01 || PS || 0x00 || T.

+-	 * PS = 0xFF padding, with length to fill em

++	/* EM = 0x00 || 0x01 || PS || 0x00 || T.

++	 * PS = 0xFF padding, with length to fill em (at least 8 bytes)

+ 	 * T = encoded_hash

+ 	 */

+-	em.len = this->k;

+-	em.ptr = malloc(em.len);

++	*em = chunk_alloc(keylen);

+ 

+ 	/* fill em with padding */

+-	memset(em.ptr, 0xFF, em.len);

++	memset(em->ptr, 0xFF, em->len);

+ 	/* set magic bytes */

+-	*(em.ptr) = 0x00;

+-	*(em.ptr+1) = 0x01;

+-	*(em.ptr + em.len - data.len - 1) = 0x00;

+-	/* set DER-encoded hash */

+-	memcpy(em.ptr + em.len - data.len, data.ptr, data.len);

++	*(em->ptr) = 0x00;

++	*(em->ptr+1) = 0x01;

++	*(em->ptr + em->len - data.len - 1) = 0x00;

++	/* set encoded hash */

++	memcpy(em->ptr + em->len - data.len, data.ptr, data.len);

++

++	chunk_clear(&digestInfo);

++	return TRUE;

++}

++

++/**

++ * Build a signature using the PKCS#1 EMSA scheme

++ */

++static bool build_emsa_pkcs1_signature(private_gmp_rsa_private_key_t *this,

++									   hash_algorithm_t hash_algorithm,

++									   chunk_t data, chunk_t *signature)

++{

++	chunk_t em;

++

++	if (!gmp_emsa_pkcs1_signature_data(hash_algorithm, data, this->k, &em))

++	{

++		return FALSE;

++	}

+ 

+ 	/* build signature */

+ 	*signature = rsasp1(this, em);

+ 

+-	free(digestInfo.ptr);

+-	free(em.ptr);

+-

++	chunk_free(&em);

+ 	return TRUE;

+ }

+ 

+diff --git a/src/libstrongswan/plugins/gmp/gmp_rsa_public_key.c b/src/libstrongswan/plugins/gmp/gmp_rsa_public_key.c

+index 52bc9fb38046..ce9a80fadf2a 100644

+--- a/src/libstrongswan/plugins/gmp/gmp_rsa_public_key.c

+@@ -70,7 +70,9 @@ struct private_gmp_rsa_public_key_t {

+ /**

+  * Shared functions defined in gmp_rsa_private_key.c

+  */

+-extern chunk_t gmp_mpz_to_chunk(const mpz_t value);

++chunk_t gmp_mpz_to_chunk(const mpz_t value);

++bool gmp_emsa_pkcs1_signature_data(hash_algorithm_t hash_algorithm,

++								   chunk_t data, size_t keylen, chunk_t *em);

+ 

+ /**

+  * RSAEP algorithm specified in PKCS#1.

+--- a/src/libstrongswan/plugins/gmp/gmp_rsa_public_key.c

+@@ -115,26 +115,13 @@

+ }

+ 

+ /**

+- * ASN.1 definition of digestInfo

+- */

+-static const asn1Object_t digestInfoObjects[] = {

+-	{ 0, "digestInfo",			ASN1_SEQUENCE,		ASN1_OBJ  }, /*  0 */

+-	{ 1,   "digestAlgorithm",	ASN1_EOC,			ASN1_RAW  }, /*  1 */

+-	{ 1,   "digest",			ASN1_OCTET_STRING,	ASN1_BODY }, /*  2 */

+-	{ 0, "exit",				ASN1_EOC,			ASN1_EXIT }

+-};

+-#define DIGEST_INFO					0

+-#define DIGEST_INFO_ALGORITHM		1

+-#define DIGEST_INFO_DIGEST			2

+-

+-/**

+  * Verification of an EMPSA PKCS1 signature described in PKCS#1

+  */

+ static bool verify_emsa_pkcs1_signature(private_gmp_rsa_public_key_t *this,

+ 										hash_algorithm_t algorithm,

+ 										chunk_t data, chunk_t signature)

+ {

+-	chunk_t em_ori, em;

++	chunk_t em_expected, em;

+ 	bool success = FALSE;

+ 

+ 	/* remove any preceding 0-bytes from signature */

+@@ -148,140 +137,19 @@ static bool verify_emsa_pkcs1_signature(private_gmp_rsa_public_key_t *this,

+ 		return FALSE;

+ 	}

+ 

+-	/* unpack signature */

+-	em_ori = em = rsavp1(this, signature);

+-

+-	/* result should look like this:

+-	 * EM = 0x00 || 0x01 || PS || 0x00 || T.

+-	 * PS = 0xFF padding, with length to fill em

+-	 * T = oid || hash

+-	 */

+-

+-	/* check magic bytes */

+-	if (em.len < 2 || *(em.ptr) != 0x00 || *(em.ptr+1) != 0x01)

++	/* generate expected signature value */

++	if (!gmp_emsa_pkcs1_signature_data(algorithm, data, this->k, &em_expected))

+ 	{

+-		goto end;

+-	}

+-	em = chunk_skip(em, 2);

+-

+-	/* find magic 0x00 */

+-	while (em.len > 0)

+-	{

+-		if (*em.ptr == 0x00)

+-		{

+-			/* found magic byte, stop */

+-			em = chunk_skip(em, 1);

+-			break;

+-		}

+-		else if (*em.ptr != 0xFF)

+-		{

+-			/* bad padding, decryption failed ?!*/

+-			goto end;

+-		}

+-		em = chunk_skip(em, 1);

+-	}

+-

+-	if (em.len == 0)

+-	{

+-		/* no digestInfo found */

+-		goto end;

+-	}

+-

+-	if (algorithm == HASH_UNKNOWN)

+-	{   /* IKEv1 signatures without digestInfo */

+-		if (em.len != data.len)

+-		{

+-			DBG1(DBG_LIB, "hash size in signature is %u bytes instead of"

+-				 " %u bytes", em.len, data.len);

+-			goto end;

+-		}

+-		success = memeq_const(em.ptr, data.ptr, data.len);

++		return FALSE;

+ 	}

+-	else

+-	{   /* IKEv2 and X.509 certificate signatures */

+-		asn1_parser_t *parser;

+-		chunk_t object;

+-		int objectID;

+-		hash_algorithm_t hash_algorithm = HASH_UNKNOWN;

+-

+-		DBG2(DBG_LIB, "signature verification:");

+-		parser = asn1_parser_create(digestInfoObjects, em);

+ 

+-		while (parser->iterate(parser, &objectID, &object))

+-		{

+-			switch (objectID)

+-			{

+-				case DIGEST_INFO:

+-				{

+-					if (em.len > object.len)

+-					{

+-						DBG1(DBG_LIB, "digestInfo field in signature is"

+-							 " followed by %u surplus bytes",

+-							 em.len - object.len);

+-						goto end_parser;

+-					}

+-					break;

+-				}

+-				case DIGEST_INFO_ALGORITHM:

+-				{

+-					int hash_oid = asn1_parse_algorithmIdentifier(object,

+-										 parser->get_level(parser)+1, NULL);

+-

+-					hash_algorithm = hasher_algorithm_from_oid(hash_oid);

+-					if (hash_algorithm == HASH_UNKNOWN || hash_algorithm != algorithm)

+-					{

+-						DBG1(DBG_LIB, "expected hash algorithm %N, but found"

+-							 " %N (OID: %#B)", hash_algorithm_names, algorithm,

+-							 hash_algorithm_names, hash_algorithm,  &object);

+-						goto end_parser;

+-					}

+-					break;

+-				}

+-				case DIGEST_INFO_DIGEST:

+-				{

+-					chunk_t hash;

+-					hasher_t *hasher;

+-

+-					hasher = lib->crypto->create_hasher(lib->crypto, hash_algorithm);

+-					if (hasher == NULL)

+-					{

+-						DBG1(DBG_LIB, "hash algorithm %N not supported",

+-							 hash_algorithm_names, hash_algorithm);

+-						goto end_parser;

+-					}

+-

+-					if (object.len != hasher->get_hash_size(hasher))

+-					{

+-						DBG1(DBG_LIB, "hash size in signature is %u bytes"

+-							 " instead of %u bytes", object.len,

+-							 hasher->get_hash_size(hasher));

+-						hasher->destroy(hasher);

+-						goto end_parser;

+-					}

+-

+-					/* build our own hash and compare */

+-					if (!hasher->allocate_hash(hasher, data, &hash))

+-					{

+-						hasher->destroy(hasher);

+-						goto end_parser;

+-					}

+-					hasher->destroy(hasher);

+-					success = memeq_const(object.ptr, hash.ptr, hash.len);

+-					free(hash.ptr);

+-					break;

+-				}

+-				default:

+-					break;

+-			}

+-		}

++	/* unpack signature */

++	em = rsavp1(this, signature);

+ 

+-end_parser:

+-		success &= parser->success(parser);

+-		parser->destroy(parser);

+-	}

++	success = chunk_equals_const(em_expected, em);

+ 

+-end:

+-	free(em_ori.ptr);

++	chunk_free(&em_expected);

++	chunk_free(&em);

+ 	return success;

+ }

+ 

+-- 

+2.7.4

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@

 Summary:          The OpenSource IPsec-based VPN Solution

 Name:             strongswan

 Version:          5.5.2

-Release:          5%{?dist}

+Release:          6%{?dist}

 License:          GPLv2+

 URL:              https://www.strongswan.org/

 Group:            System Environment/Security

@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ Patch1:           CVE-2017-9023.patch

 Patch2:           CVE-2017-11185.patch

 Patch3:           CVE-2018-5388.patch

 Patch4:           CVE-2018-10811.patch

+Patch5:           CVE-2018-16151-16152.patch

 BuildRequires:    autoconf

 %description

@@ -26,6 +27,7 @@ strongSwan is a complete IPsec implementation for Linux 2.6, 3.x, and 4.x kernel

 %patch2 -p1

 %patch3 -p1

 %patch4 -p1

+%patch5 -p1

 %build

 ./configure --prefix=%{_prefix} --sysconfdir=%{_sysconfdir}

@@ -55,6 +57,8 @@ rm -rf %{buildroot}/*

 %{_datadir}/strongswan/*

 %changelog

+*   Thu Jan 03 2019 Keerthana K <keerthanak@vmware.com> 5.5.2-6

+-   Fix for CVE-2018-16151 and CVE-2018-16152.

 *   Thu Aug 16 2018 Tapas Kundu <tkundu@vmware.com> 5.5.2-5

 -   Fix for CVE-2018-10811

 *   Mon Jul 16 2018 Ajay Kaher <akaher@vmware.com> 5.5.2-4