new file mode 100644

@@ -0,0 +1,344 @@

+From f6110a8fee2ca36f8e2d2abecf3cba9fa7b8ea7d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001

+From: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>

+Date: Mon, 19 Jun 2017 17:09:55 +0200

+Subject: [PATCH 1/1] CVE-2017-1000366: Ignore LD_LIBRARY_PATH for AT_SECURE=1

+ programs [BZ #21624]

+

+LD_LIBRARY_PATH can only be used to reorder system search paths, which

+is not useful functionality.

+

+This makes an exploitable unbounded alloca in _dl_init_paths unreachable

+for AT_SECURE=1 programs.

+---

+ elf/rtld.c | 3 ++-

+ 1 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

+

+diff --git a/elf/rtld.c b/elf/rtld.c

+index 2446a87..2269dbe 100644

+--- a/elf/rtld.c

+@@ -2422,7 +2422,8 @@ process_envvars (enum mode *modep)

+ 

+ 	case 12:

+ 	  /* The library search path.  */

+-	  if (memcmp (envline, "LIBRARY_PATH", 12) == 0)

++	  if (!__libc_enable_secure

++	      && memcmp (envline, "LIBRARY_PATH", 12) == 0)

+ 	    {

+ 	      library_path = &envline[13];

+ 	      break;

+From 6d0ba622891bed9d8394eef1935add53003b12e8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001

+From: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>

+Date: Mon, 19 Jun 2017 22:31:04 +0200

+Subject: [PATCH] ld.so: Reject overly long LD_PRELOAD path elements

+

+---

+ elf/rtld.c | 82 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------

+ 1 files changed, 73 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)

+

+diff --git a/elf/rtld.c b/elf/rtld.c

+index 2269dbe..86ae20c 100644

+--- a/elf/rtld.c

+@@ -99,6 +99,35 @@ uintptr_t __pointer_chk_guard_local

+ strong_alias (__pointer_chk_guard_local, __pointer_chk_guard)

+ #endif

+ 

++/* Length limits for names and paths, to protect the dynamic linker,

++   particularly when __libc_enable_secure is active.  */

++#ifdef NAME_MAX

++# define SECURE_NAME_LIMIT NAME_MAX

++#else

++# define SECURE_NAME_LIMIT 255

++#endif

++#ifdef PATH_MAX

++# define SECURE_PATH_LIMIT PATH_MAX

++#else

++# define SECURE_PATH_LIMIT 1024

++#endif

++

++/* Check that AT_SECURE=0, or that the passed name does not contain

++   directories and is not overly long.  Reject empty names

++   unconditionally.  */

++static bool

++dso_name_valid_for_suid (const char *p)

++{

++  if (__glibc_unlikely (__libc_enable_secure))

++    {

++      /* Ignore pathnames with directories for AT_SECURE=1

++	 programs, and also skip overlong names.  */

++      size_t len = strlen (p);

++      if (len >= SECURE_NAME_LIMIT || memchr (p, '/', len) != NULL)

++	return false;

++    }

++  return *p != '\0';

++}

+ 

+ /* List of auditing DSOs.  */

+ static struct audit_list

+@@ -718,6 +747,42 @@ static const char *preloadlist attribute_relro;

+ /* Nonzero if information about versions has to be printed.  */

+ static int version_info attribute_relro;

+ 

++/* The LD_PRELOAD environment variable gives list of libraries

++   separated by white space or colons that are loaded before the

++   executable's dependencies and prepended to the global scope list.

++   (If the binary is running setuid all elements containing a '/' are

++   ignored since it is insecure.)  Return the number of preloads

++   performed.  */

++unsigned int

++handle_ld_preload (const char *preloadlist, struct link_map *main_map)

++{

++  unsigned int npreloads = 0;

++  const char *p = preloadlist;

++  char fname[SECURE_PATH_LIMIT];

++

++  while (*p != '\0')

++    {

++      /* Split preload list at space/colon.  */

++      size_t len = strcspn (p, " :");

++      if (len > 0 && len < sizeof (fname))

++	{

++	  memcpy (fname, p, len);

++	  fname[len] = '\0';

++	}

++      else

++	fname[0] = '\0';

++

++      /* Skip over the substring and the following delimiter.  */

++      p += len;

++      if (*p != '\0')

++	++p;

++

++      if (dso_name_valid_for_suid (fname))

++	npreloads += do_preload (fname, main_map, "LD_PRELOAD");

++    }

++  return npreloads;

++}

++

+ static void

+ dl_main (const ElfW(Phdr) *phdr,

+ 	 ElfW(Word) phnum,

+@@ -1464,23 +1529,8 @@ ERROR: ld.so: object '%s' cannot be loaded as audit interface: %s; ignored.\n",

+ 

+   if (__glibc_unlikely (preloadlist != NULL))

+     {

+-      /* The LD_PRELOAD environment variable gives list of libraries

+-	 separated by white space or colons that are loaded before the

+-	 executable's dependencies and prepended to the global scope

+-	 list.  If the binary is running setuid all elements

+-	 containing a '/' are ignored since it is insecure.  */

+-      char *list = strdupa (preloadlist);

+-      char *p;

+-

+       HP_TIMING_NOW (start);

+-

+-      /* Prevent optimizing strsep.  Speed is not important here.  */

+-      while ((p = (strsep) (&list, " :")) != NULL)

+-	if (p[0] != '\0'

+-	    && (__builtin_expect (! __libc_enable_secure, 1)

+-		|| strchr (p, '/') == NULL))

+-	  npreloads += do_preload (p, main_map, "LD_PRELOAD");

+-

++      npreloads += handle_ld_preload (preloadlist, main_map);

+       HP_TIMING_NOW (stop);

+       HP_TIMING_DIFF (diff, start, stop);

+       HP_TIMING_ACCUM_NT (load_time, diff);

+From 81b82fb966ffbd94353f793ad17116c6088dedd9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001

+From: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>

+Date: Mon, 19 Jun 2017 22:32:12 +0200

+Subject: [PATCH] ld.so: Reject overly long LD_AUDIT path elements

+

+Also only process the last LD_AUDIT entry.

+---

+ elf/rtld.c | 110 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------

+ 1 files changed, 106 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)

+

+diff --git a/elf/rtld.c b/elf/rtld.c

+index 86ae20c..65647fb 100644

+--- a/elf/rtld.c

+@@ -129,13 +129,91 @@ dso_name_valid_for_suid (const char *p)

+   return *p != '\0';

+ }

+ 

+-/* List of auditing DSOs.  */

++/* LD_AUDIT variable contents.  Must be processed before the

++   audit_list below.  */

++const char *audit_list_string;

++

++/* Cyclic list of auditing DSOs.  audit_list->next is the first

++   element.  */

+ static struct audit_list

+ {

+   const char *name;

+   struct audit_list *next;

+ } *audit_list;

+ 

++/* Iterator for audit_list_string followed by audit_list.  */

++struct audit_list_iter

++{

++  /* Tail of audit_list_string still needing processing, or NULL.  */

++  const char *audit_list_tail;

++

++  /* The list element returned in the previous iteration.  NULL before

++     the first element.  */

++  struct audit_list *previous;

++

++  /* Scratch buffer for returning a name which is part of

++     audit_list_string.  */

++  char fname[SECURE_NAME_LIMIT];

++};

++

++/* Initialize an audit list iterator.  */

++static void

++audit_list_iter_init (struct audit_list_iter *iter)

++{

++  iter->audit_list_tail = audit_list_string;

++  iter->previous = NULL;

++}

++

++/* Iterate through both audit_list_string and audit_list.  */

++static const char *

++audit_list_iter_next (struct audit_list_iter *iter)

++{

++  if (iter->audit_list_tail != NULL)

++    {

++      /* First iterate over audit_list_string.  */

++      while (*iter->audit_list_tail != '\0')

++	{

++	  /* Split audit list at colon.  */

++	  size_t len = strcspn (iter->audit_list_tail, ":");

++	  if (len > 0 && len < sizeof (iter->fname))

++	    {

++	      memcpy (iter->fname, iter->audit_list_tail, len);

++	      iter->fname[len] = '\0';

++	    }

++	  else

++	    /* Do not return this name to the caller.  */

++	    iter->fname[0] = '\0';

++

++	  /* Skip over the substring and the following delimiter.  */

++	  iter->audit_list_tail += len;

++	  if (*iter->audit_list_tail == ':')

++	    ++iter->audit_list_tail;

++

++	  /* If the name is valid, return it.  */

++	  if (dso_name_valid_for_suid (iter->fname))

++	    return iter->fname;

++	  /* Otherwise, wrap around and try the next name.  */

++	}

++      /* Fall through to the procesing of audit_list.  */

++    }

++

++  if (iter->previous == NULL)

++    {

++      if (audit_list == NULL)

++	/* No pre-parsed audit list.  */

++	return NULL;

++      /* Start of audit list.  The first list element is at

++	 audit_list->next (cyclic list).  */

++      iter->previous = audit_list->next;

++      return iter->previous->name;

++    }

++  if (iter->previous == audit_list)

++    /* Cyclic list wrap-around.  */

++    return NULL;

++  iter->previous = iter->previous->next;

++  return iter->previous->name;

++}

++

+ #ifndef HAVE_INLINED_SYSCALLS

+ /* Set nonzero during loading and initialization of executable and

+    libraries, cleared before the executable's entry point runs.  This

+@@ -1305,11 +1383,13 @@ of this helper program; chances are you did not intend to run this program.\n\

+     GL(dl_rtld_map).l_tls_modid = _dl_next_tls_modid ();

+ 

+   /* If we have auditing DSOs to load, do it now.  */

+-  if (__glibc_unlikely (audit_list != NULL))

++  bool need_security_init = true;

++  if (__glibc_unlikely (audit_list != NULL)

++      || __glibc_unlikely (audit_list_string != NULL))

+     {

+-      /* Iterate over all entries in the list.  The order is important.  */

+       struct audit_ifaces *last_audit = NULL;

+-      struct audit_list *al = audit_list->next;

++      struct audit_list_iter al_iter;

++      audit_list_iter_init (&al_iter);

+ 

+       /* Since we start using the auditing DSOs right away we need to

+ 	 initialize the data structures now.  */

+@@ -1320,9 +1400,14 @@ of this helper program; chances are you did not intend to run this program.\n\

+ 	 use different values (especially the pointer guard) and will

+ 	 fail later on.  */

+       security_init ();

++      need_security_init = false;

+ 

+-      do

++      while (true)

+ 	{

++	  const char *name = audit_list_iter_next (&al_iter);

++	  if (name == NULL)

++	    break;

++

+ 	  int tls_idx = GL(dl_tls_max_dtv_idx);

+ 

+ 	  /* Now it is time to determine the layout of the static TLS

+@@ -1331,7 +1416,7 @@ of this helper program; chances are you did not intend to run this program.\n\

+ 	     no DF_STATIC_TLS bit is set.  The reason is that we know

+ 	     glibc will use the static model.  */

+ 	  struct dlmopen_args dlmargs;

+-	  dlmargs.fname = al->name;

++	  dlmargs.fname = name;

+ 	  dlmargs.map = NULL;

+ 

+ 	  const char *objname;

+@@ -1344,7 +1429,7 @@ of this helper program; chances are you did not intend to run this program.\n\

+ 	    not_loaded:

+ 	      _dl_error_printf ("\

+ ERROR: ld.so: object '%s' cannot be loaded as audit interface: %s; ignored.\n",

+-				al->name, err_str);

++				name, err_str);

+ 	      if (malloced)

+ 		free ((char *) err_str);

+ 	    }

+@@ -1448,10 +1533,7 @@ ERROR: ld.so: object '%s' cannot be loaded as audit interface: %s; ignored.\n",

+ 		  goto not_loaded;

+ 		}

+ 	    }

+-

+-	  al = al->next;

+ 	}

+-      while (al != audit_list->next);

+ 

+       /* If we have any auditing modules, announce that we already

+ 	 have two objects loaded.  */

+@@ -1715,7 +1797,7 @@ ERROR: ld.so: object '%s' cannot be loaded as audit interface: %s; ignored.\n",

+   if (tcbp == NULL)

+     tcbp = init_tls ();

+ 

+-  if (__glibc_likely (audit_list == NULL))

++  if (__glibc_likely (need_security_init))

+     /* Initialize security features.  But only if we have not done it

+        earlier.  */

+     security_init ();

+@@ -2346,9 +2428,7 @@ process_dl_audit (char *str)

+   char *p;

+ 

+   while ((p = (strsep) (&str, ":")) != NULL)

+-    if (p[0] != '\0'

+-	&& (__builtin_expect (! __libc_enable_secure, 1)

+-	    || strchr (p, '/') == NULL))

++    if (dso_name_valid_for_suid (p))

+       {

+ 	/* This is using the local malloc, not the system malloc.  The

+ 	   memory can never be freed.  */

+@@ -2412,7 +2492,7 @@ process_envvars (enum mode *modep)

+ 	      break;

+ 	    }

+ 	  if (memcmp (envline, "AUDIT", 5) == 0)

+-	    process_dl_audit (&envline[6]);

++	    audit_list_string = &envline[6];

+ 	  break;

+ 

+ 	case 7:

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@

 Summary:	Main C library

 Name:		glibc

 Version:	2.25

-Release:	3%{?dist}

+Release:	4%{?dist}

 License:	LGPLv2+

 URL:		http://www.gnu.org/software/libc

 Group:		Applications/System

@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ Source1:	locale-gen.sh

 Source2:	locale-gen.conf

 Patch0:   	http://www.linuxfromscratch.org/patches/downloads/glibc/glibc-2.25-fhs-1.patch

 Patch1:		glibc-2.24-bindrsvport-blacklist.patch

+Patch2:         glibc-fix-CVE-2017-1000366.patch

 Provides:	rtld(GNU_HASH)

 Requires:       filesystem

 %description

@@ -71,6 +72,7 @@ Name Service Cache Daemon

 sed -i 's/\\$$(pwd)/`pwd`/' timezone/Makefile

 %patch0 -p1

 %patch1 -p1

+%patch2 -p1

 install -vdm 755 %{_builddir}/%{name}-build

 # do not try to explicitly provide GLIBC_PRIVATE versioned libraries

 %define __find_provides %{_builddir}/%{name}-%{version}/find_provides.sh

@@ -253,6 +255,8 @@ sed -i 's@#!/bin/bash@#!/bin/sh@' %{buildroot}/usr/bin/tzselect

 %changelog

+*   Tue Aug 08 2017 Anish Swaminathan <anishs@vmware.com> 2.25-4

+-   Apply fix for CVE-2017-1000366

 *   Thu May 4  2017 Bo Gan <ganb@vmware.com> 2.25-3

 -   Remove bash dependency in post/postun script

 *   Fri Apr 21 2017 Alexey Makhalov <amakhalov@vmware.com> 2.25-2